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ABSTRACT 
Relations between the United States and North Korea reached a pivotal point in 
2018 when a noticeable détente occurred while the United States pursued a foreign policy 
of denuclearization toward North Korea. The policy was predicated on the  complete, 
verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the North Korean nuclear weapons 
program. This thesis asks whether the current United States policy toward North Korea, 
which places continued emphasis on the only acceptable condition for denuclearization 
be that it is complete, verifiable, and irreversible, is the best strategy, or if there are 
alternatives to this policy that the United States could feasibly pursue? This thesis 
answers the research question by examining and analyzing nuclear proliferation drivers 
and inhibitors and conducting a comparative study in which some cases maintain a 
nuclear weapons program and others have chosen to abandon such efforts. The study of 
proliferation drivers and inhibitors concluded that North Korea is unlikely to accept the 
conditions of complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization. However, the United 
States can likely achieve tangible and genuine results toward denuclearization by 
changing its perspective on North Korean nuclear weapons and adopting a policy that 
embraces North Korea’s unique reasons for nuclear proliferation.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Relations between the United States (U.S.) and North Korea reached a pivotal point 
in 2018.1 Tensions between the countries were on the verge of exploding into kinetic military 
action the year before because North Korea conducted numerous provocative ballistic missile 
tests which threatened the United States’ own security and its interests in the East Asia region. 
As a result of the rising tensions, President Donald Trump declared that “Rocket Man [Kim 
Jung-Un] is on a suicide mission for himself and his regime.”2 Then, following an 
intercontinental ballistic missile launch by North Korea, the testing stopped for an extended 
period of time until May 4, 2019, when North Korea conducted its first ballistic missile test 
launch in over a year.  
During this period of détente, the U.S. continued to enforce a foreign policy centered 
on the denuclearization North Korea. The ultimate goal of this policy is denuclearization 
achieved through the “complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement” (CVID) of North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons program. In 2018–2019, the U.S. participated in diplomatic 
engagements with North Korea at the highest level, enforced economic sanctions and 
displayed military shows of force, all aimed at achieving denuclearization through 
negotiations. For the U.S., denuclearization is the preferred outcome to ensure the defense and 
security of the continental United States, its allies in the Pacific, protect U.S. interests and 
maintain stability in the region.3 To its credit, the strategy prevented a continuation of the 
downward spiral of 2017, but despite all of the negotiation efforts, full denuclearization was 
not attained during the 2018–2019 détente. This thesis seeks to answer whether the current 
United States policy toward North Korea, which places a continued emphasis on the only 
acceptable condition for denuclearization being that it is complete, verifiable, and irreversible 
 
1 This thesis represents the academic views of the author and does not necessarily represent the official 
policy position of the Naval Postgraduate School, the U.S. Air Force, or the Department of Defense. The 
thesis contains policy advocacy and assessment in service of the academic mission of NPS. 
2 Alicia Sanders-Zakre, “Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” Arms 
Control, June 2019, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron. 
3 Van Jackson, On the Brink: Trump, Kim, and the Threat of Nuclear War (Cambridge, United 
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 8–9. 
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(CVID), is the best strategy, or if there are alternatives to this policy that the United States 
could feasibly pursue.  
To answer the research question, this thesis examines the current policy against what 
is known of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and its motivations for maintaining nuclear 
weapons. It will also compare North Korea’s case to other states where non-proliferation has 
been successful and unsuccessful to evaluate if there are alternative policies that will have a 
better prospect for achieving actual legitimate steps toward North Korea denuclearization. 
Ultimately, I examine whether the United States should continue with the complete, 
verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization policy and if there are alternative strategies the 
United States should select.  
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The United States considers a nuclear North Korea as a security threat and the best 
way to minimize or negate the threat is through denuclearization. In the 2018 State of the 
Union speech, President Trump claimed North Korea was in “reckless pursuit of nuclear 
missiles,” and added that North Korea “could very soon threaten our homeland.”4 However, 
this is just a recent example of the U.S.’s concern over North Korea as a national security 
threat. To address the nuclear threat, several administrations have vigorously pursued 
denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, and some have steadily insisted that complete, 
verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization is the only acceptable policy outcome.5 
Curiously, despite years of enforcing CVID through multi- and bilateral negotiations with 
North Korea, very little has actually been achieved by way of denuclearization. For example, 
during the second meeting between President Trump and Kim Jung-Un in Singapore, they 
both signed a Joint Statement which included a stipulation that North Korea “commits to work 
 
4 “President Donald J. Trump’s State of the Union Address,” White House, January 30, 2018, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-state-union-address/. 
5 “Remarks on DPRK at Stanford University,” United States Department of State, January 31, 2019, 
https://www.state.gov/remarks-on-dprk-at-stanford-university/. 
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toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”6 However, at the time of this 
writing over two years later, complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is nowhere 
close to finished. While it was a positive step for the Joint Statement to include an overall goal 
of denuclearizing, many scholars and critics have observed that the term denuclearization 
lacks definition and procedural details. The lack of refinement and details may be at least a 
partial reason for why North Korea continues with nuclear proliferation and why past attempts 
by the United States to secure North Korea’s denuclearization have been unsuccessful, but it 
is possible there are other reasons.7  
Therefore, it is reasonable to examine whether the current denuclearization policy—
which stipulates the only acceptable condition being complete, verifiable, and irreversible 
denuclearization—is the best policy to pursue with North Korea. Some follow-on questions 
to be considered are: Is denuclearization even attainable? Is CVID the only way to preserve 
regional stability and ensure U.S. national security? This thesis will look to answer those 
questions in an effort to ascertain if CVID is the only acceptable outcome and, if not, whether 
there are alternative means to achieve it. The analysis will consider what denuclearization 
means to North Korea. From the North Korean perspective, how do North Koreans view the 
nuclear weapons program, and what conditions must be met in order to see the regime 
acquiesce to this policy? This thesis may show that complete, verifiable, and irreversible 
denuclearization is indeed the best policy toward North Korea for the security of the United 
States and our allies. However, the thesis may reveal that there are better policy options for 
the United States that will garner the same desired effect. Potential options may be close to 
CVID without the insistence on attaining perfection. Alternative policies may place greater 
focus on incremental steps to achieving denuclearization through strategies that target other 
objectives, such as pursing policy that accepts North Korea as a defacto nuclear weapons state, 
engaging in multilateral negotiations, developing arms control measures, using sanctions as 
 
6 “Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim 
Jong Un of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit,” White House, June 12, 
2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-united-
states-america-chairman-kim-jong-un-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-singapore-summit/. 
7 Dan Altman and Nicholas L. Miller, “Red Lines in Nuclear Nonproliferation,” The Nonproliferation 
Review 24, no. 3–4 (May 4, 2017): 319, https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2018.1433575. 
4 
leverage in negotiations, and adopting a more diplomatic approach to policy to influence 
denuclearization. Ultimately, this research question is important because it helps 
decisionmakers select policy options that will yield the desired outcome, which in the case of 
North Korea, is to maintain the security of the U.S. and its allies and to preserve stability in 
the region.  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The United States clearly expresses concern for a nuclear-armed North Korea, 
viewing it as a credible national security threat. For example, in the 2017 National Security 
Strategy, North Korea is explicitly mentioned by name a total of 17 times. On page one in the 
executive summary, President Trump states that “we are rallying the world against the rogue 
regime in North Korea.”8 Additionally, on four occasions the National Security Strategy 
highlights that the threat posed by a nuclear-armed North Korea is not just to the United States, 
but also to our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region and all over the world. The Trump 
administration has taken some unconventional steps to address this threat to include historic 
bilateral summits and impromptu meetings at the Korean Demilitarized Zone, while running 
a “Maximum Pressure Campaign” against North Korea. In fact, the United States has a history 
of implementing various policies and strategies targeted at North Korea in an effort to stop 
their development and proliferation of a nuclear weapons program.9  
The national security threat posed by a nuclear North Korea has been studied at length 
by policymakers and academics for decades. To answer the research question, this thesis aims 
to complete an assessment of the three major relevant areas that relate to the research question: 
1) the current and historic denuclearization policy toward North Korea, 2) the factors and 
explanations of non-proliferation and proliferation, and 3) North Korea’s strategic thinking 
 
8 White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: 
White House, 2017), 1, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-
0905.pdf. 
9 Daniel R. Depetris, “A More Realistic and Restrained U.S. Policy Toward North Korea | 38 North: 
Informed Analysis of North Korea,” 38 North, August 12, 2019, https://www.38north.org/2019/08/
ddepetris081219/. 
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about nuclear weapons. The following will review and discuss the literature that presents those 
specific areas.  
There is little doubt that North Korea has an active nuclear weapons program. North 
Korea’s interest in beginning its own nuclear program started in the mid-1950s.10 Early 
development of nuclear capabilities slowed in the 1990s as a result of a strong effort by the 
non-proliferation regime, but it sped up again in the early 2000s following North Korea’s 
withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and similar non-proliferation agreements. 
North Korea’s nuclear arsenal today is estimated to contain approximately 20–30 warheads.11 
Siegfried S. Hecker of Stanford University, former Director of the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory, is one of a few Americans who has been allowed to visit and observe portions of 
North Korea’s nuclear program. Following his 2017 visit, Hecker estimated North Korea had 
enough plutonium and highly enriched uranium, necessary materials to fuel a nuclear weapon, 
for “20 to 25 nuclear devices today [2017] and the capacity to produce an additional one every 
six to seven weeks.”12 If extrapolated to today, this would suggest an arsenal of approximately 
100 nuclear devices. In sum, this account supports the belief that North Korea more than an 
aspiring nuclear weapons state but, is in fact, a de facto nuclear weapons state.  
However, to evaluate nuclear policy toward North Korea, it is necessary to review 
some of the literature on nuclear nonproliferation with regard to several questions: Why does 
it work sometimes, but not all the time? What are the common characteristics between states 
who chose not to attain nuclear weapons and those who had them and gave them up? What 
are the main factors influencing non-proliferation decisions? Does the non-proliferation 
regime really influence state proliferation decision-making? There questions are relevant 
because nuclear non-proliferation has been effective in some cases but not others throughout 
history. In some extreme cases, states have had nuclear weapons—such as South Africa—and 
 
10 Nicholas L Miller and Vipin Narang, “North Korea Defied the Theoretical Odds: What Can We 
Learn from Its Successful Nuclearization?,” Texas National Security Review 1, no. 2 (March 2018): 71. 
11 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2019: Armaments, Disarmament 
and International Security (Solona, Sweden: Oxford University Press, 2019), https://www.sipri.org/sites/
default/files/2019-06/yb19_summary_eng_1.pdf. 




given them up. In other cases, states have been on their way to obtaining nuclear weapons—
such as South Korea and Taiwan—only to abandon their programs.  
Scholars have found there are certain factors associated with nonproliferation 
decisions. Herman and Peters believe the decisions are often tied to back to both some level 
of pressure from the United States and the deciding states’ security and internal domestic 
factors.13 On the other hand, Coe and Vaynman attribute pressure on a state from the 
nonproliferation regime as a causal reason. They argue this is successful due to the following 
reason(s). The state agreeing to non-proliferation perceives this to be in their best interest, or 
because proliferating states are leery of punishment from the non-proliferation regime, or 
because there is trust that the regime can contain widespread proliferation.14 Additionally, 
Sagan posits that states choose to participate in nonproliferation as a result of changes to their 
external security, changes to their domestic politics, and the adoption of Nonproliferation 
Treaty norms.15 Finally, Altman and Miller offer that nonproliferation policies often fail 
because the restrictions placed on nuclear weapon programs are either “imprecise, arbitrary, 
incomplete or unverifiable.”16 On the other hand, Joseph Cirincione, a nuclear weapons 
proliferation expert, argues proliferation drivers can be summed in the following five reasons: 
security, prestige, domestic politics, technology, and economics.17  
For North Korea, the potential motivation for a nuclear weapons program is highly 
analyzed and seems to fit within the framework of Cirincione’s drivers for acquiring nuclear 
weapons. Other literature attributes proliferation drivers to be more or less focused on just a 
few drivers. In this regard, Pak, Hass, Cha, Kang, and Hecker are among leading scholars in 
the field who believe North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is mainly about internal and 
 
13 Rebecca K. C. Hersman and Robert Peters, “Nuclear U-Turns,” The Nonproliferation Review 13, 
no. 3 (November 1, 2006): 539–53, https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700601071629. 
14 Andrew J. Coe and Jane Vaynman, “Collusion and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” The 
Journal of Politics 77, no. 4 (October 1, 2015): 983–97, https://doi.org/10.1086/682080. 
15 Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” 
International Security 21, no. 3 (1996): 54–86, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539273. 
16 Altman and Miller, “Red Lines in Nuclear Nonproliferation.” 
17 Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History & Future of Nuclear Weapons (New York and 
Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press, 2007), 47. 
7 
external security for the authoritarian regime. However, others, such as Snyder and Milani, 
argue there are still additional motivational factors beyond internal and external security 
concerns such as economic security and domestic ideological legitimization. Nuclear 
weapons provide economic security because North Korea uses nuclear negotiations to get 
monetary aid and they act as leverage for reducing economic sanctions.18 Moreover, they also 
provide domestic ideological legitimation because they show the strength, power and 
resiliency of the regime to the North Korean elite and overall population.19 To further evaluate 
why some countries proliferate and others do not, Philip Bleek and Etel Solingen each conduct 
comprehensive case studies. Bleek’s study analyzes the behavior of all proliferating countries, 
while Solingen’s looks for proliferation behavior patterns, focusing on Middle East and East 
Asia cases.  
Historically, the United States has undertaken various approaches to enforcing a 
denuclearization policy with North Korea that is predicated on being complete, verifiable and 
irreversible. The most significant attempts have been the Agreed Framework, Six Party Talks, 
the Leap Year Agreement and, most recently, the “Maximum Pressure Campaign” and 
diplomatic bilateral summits in 2019. Again, scholars and policymakers alike mostly agree 
the best way to ensure the United States’ national security and the security of our allies in the 
region is through a denuclearized North Korea. The most discord among scholars and experts 
is on how to achieve denuclearization. Many contend it is unwise for the United States to 
unconditionally accept a nuclear-armed North Korea and that denuclearizing North Korea is 
the right end-state but suggest that the strategy to achieve denuclearization should be different. 
Cha and Kang are both advocates of an engagement strategy but differ on how to exercise 
engagement—Cha supports a hawkish approach to North Korea, while Kang supports an 
approach that restrains the pressure on North Korea.20 In another article, Cha argues for more 
 
18 Marco Milani, The Evolution of the North Korean Nuclear Program: From Survival Strategy to 
Ideological Legitimization, Academic Paper Series (Washington, DC: Korea Economic Institute of 
America, 2018), 6–7, https://keia.org/publication/the-evolution-of-the-north-korean-nuclear-program-from-
survival-strategy-to-ideological-legitimization/. 
19 Jackson, On the Brink, 50. 
20 Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies, 2nd 
ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018). 
8 
balance in the most recent approach toward North Korea, advancing a “comprehensive 
coercive strategy” which blends the confrontational and engagement elements of the last 
United States’ strategy.21 Similarly, Pak and Hass offer a strategy to combine “pressure and 
engagement” and bring North Korea back into negotiations.22 Overall, the literature offers a 
mix of strategic approaches for achieving denuclearization. 
One major consideration is the North Korean regime itself which should play a 
significant role in the approach to United States’ foreign policy decisions. To complicate 
matters, when dealing with North Korea, it is difficult to know with absolute certainty what 
the regime’s true objectives are and how the government operates. Cha references Byman and 
Pollack, who claim that in regimes where power is centralized around an individual, “the 
influence of the leader’s personality and preferences will increase, as well as the impact of the 
leader on policy decision outcomes.”23 Cha further argues that this point is amplified in North 
Korea’s authoritarian regime due to its weak institutions.24 An understanding of the North 
Korean regime and how it interprets the value of a nuclear weapons program is a key element 
to developing United States policy.  
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND OUTCOMES 
This thesis examines the United States’ nuclear policy toward North Korea. The 
research question is asking if a policy that stipulates the only condition to the North’s 
denuclearization be that it is complete, verifiable, and irreversible is the best policy option to 
achieve denuclearization. The literature on nuclear proliferation presents several potential 
causal reasons to explain why states proliferate nuclear weapons. Additionally, the literature 
review focused on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and why attempts at 
 
21 Victor Cha and Katrin Fraser Katz, “The Right Way to Coerce North Korea: Ending the Threat 
without Going to War Essays,” Foreign Affairs 97, no. 3 (2018): 92, https://heinonline.org/HOL/
P?h=hein.journals/fora97&i=519. 
22 Jung H Pak and Ryan L Hass, Beyond Maximum Pressure: A Pathway to North Korean 
Denuclearization, Policy Brief (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 2017), 7, 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/beyond-maximum-pressure-a-pathway-to-north-korean-
denuclearization/. 
23 Victor D. Cha, “The North Korea Question,” Asian Survey 56, no. 2 (2016): 244, https://doi.org/
10.2307/26663696. 
24 Cha, 244–45. 
9 
nonproliferation have not always worked. The lessons from both can be extrapolated and 
applied to the case of North Korea and to the denuclearization policy that the United States 
has pursued.  
There are two potential outcomes for this thesis. First is that the status quo is the best 
policy. For the purposes of this thesis, the best policy is defined as the policy choice that 
realizes actual and legitimate steps toward denuclearization. This outcome holds that the 
current policy should remain unchanged and the demand for North Korea’s complete, 
verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization should continue. The second outcome is that there 
are other alternatives to achieving denuclearization that are more viable than CVID. This 
outcome still has the United States pursuing an end goal of denuclearization but utilizes a 
different strategy to attain the goal, accepting something less than 100 percent 
denuclearization. To prove any one of the two outcomes will require an analysis of the factors 
that drive and inhibit nuclear proliferation, an examination of North Korea, to better 
understand its motivations for a nuclear weapons program, and a comparative study of actual 
cases of countries with and without nuclear weapons programs to extrapolate any similarities, 
differences, or commonalities that will indicate how likely North Korea is to denuclearize. 
Based on the results of the study, this thesis will examine why nonproliferation has not worked 
with North Korea so far. The research design to accompany the thesis will be discussed in 
more detail in the next section.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
To answer the research question, this thesis will assess the empirical evidence from 
the research utilizing secondary and some primary sources to determine which outcome is 
most likely. The research design includes four major areas and begins with a presentation of 
current and historical United States-North Korea denuclearization policy. This review is 
designed to show the various attempts the United States has made over the last 70 years to 
denuclearize North Korea and the strategies that have been used to try achieving it. This area 
specifically looks for any consistencies and inconsistencies in U.S.-North Korea 
denuclearization policy, agreements, and negotiations over the years.  
10 
The design also includes the significant factors for nuclear weapons proliferation and 
nonproliferation; looking for explanations of why nonproliferation of nuclear weapons works 
for some states and not others. To test these explanations for applicability toward North Korea, 
the thesis includes the aforementioned comparative study. The study compares states that have 
successfully denuclearized with states who retain nuclear weapons programs. The successful 
denuclearization cases are South Africa, South Korea, Libya, Egypt, and Taiwan. The cases 
of states with nuclear weapons programs are China, India, and Pakistan. 
Next, the research design attempts to understand North Korea’s strategic thinking, 
comprehend its interests in relation to nuclear weapons, and determine the prospects for 
denuclearization. Finally, the design includes a conclusion that answers the research question 
as well as providing potential alternative strategies to achieving denuclearization that are 
different from the complete, verifiable, and irreversible strategy.   
E. THESIS OVERVIEW  
This thesis is organized in four chapters. The next chapter includes an assessment of 
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. The purpose is primarily to validate North Korea’s 
status as a de facto nuclear state by examining North Korea’s perception of the threat, its 
nuclear weapons program history and current status, and past nonproliferation negotiation 
efforts. Chapter III is an analysis of nuclear weapons proliferation. It assesses the factors 
driving and inhibiting nuclear proliferation. Subsequently, the chapter consists of a 
comparative case study to evaluate why nonproliferation works for some states and not others. 
The study seeks to identify any similarities, differences, or commonalities between these cases 
and North Korea to indicate which outcome would be most supportive. Finally, Chapter IV 
assesses North Korea’s motivations for nuclear weapons and identifies potential alternative 
strategies to achieving denuclearization. These alternatives are different from the current 
CVID strategy. 
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II. ASSESSMENT OF NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
PROGRAM 
The United States has maintained the same principle objective for the national 
security policy for North Korea since the Bush administration first adopted it in 2004.25 
Complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization has stayed the cornerstone of 
United States-North Korea negotiations for three presidential administrations, despite little 
actionable or long term results.26 Evaluating whether this approach toward North Korea is 
the best policy option for the United States, requires an understanding of North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons program. This program is the United States’ primary national security 
concern when dealing with North Korea. 
North Korea is a state surrounded in secrecy and shielded from the outside world, 
but there is little doubt that North Korea has an active nuclear weapons program. It is 
frequently referred to as a de facto nuclear state: it is not accepted by the non-proliferation 
regime as a Nuclear Weapons State (NWS) in accordance with the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT), yet is still acknowledged by many to have an illicit yet increasingly capable 
nuclear weapons program.  
North Korea’s interest in beginning its own nuclear program started in the mid-
1950s.27 The evolution of North Korea’s nuclear program has been consistently persistent. 
Some attempts by the non-proliferation regime appear to have at least marginally affected 
early development of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities in the 1990s, but it sped up again 
in the early 2000s following North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT and similar non-
proliferation agreements. North Korea’s nuclear arsenal today is estimated to contain 
approximately 20–30 warheads.27F28  
 
25 Jackson, On the Brink, 53. 
26 Robert Jervis and Mira Rapp-Hooper, “Perception and Misperception on the Korean Peninsula: 
How Unwanted Wars Begin,” Foreign Affairs 97, no. 3 (May 1, 2018): 104. 
27 “North Korea,” Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), October 2018, https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/
north-korea/nuclear/. 
28 “SIPRI Yearbook 2019,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, July 2019, 
https://www-sipriyearbook-org.libproxy.nps.edu/view/9780198839996/sipri-9780198839996.xml. 
12 
The following chapter proceeds in four main sections. First, I examine North 
Korea’s threat perceptions and how they may motivate North Korea to have a nuclear 
weapons program. North Korea likely perceives both external threats—the U.S., South 
Korea, and China—and internal, domestic issues as threating to the security and survival 
of the Kim regime. These threat perceptions motivate the existence of North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons program because nuclear weapons ultimately maintains the regime’s 
security and protection. Second, I provide a brief overview of North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons program history and illustrate the persistent evolution of the regime’s program to 
include nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Third, I discuss the current status of the 
nuclear program. Experts estimate the regime’s nuclear arsenal today to be small but 
increasing in capability. Finally, this chapter highlights significant negotiation attempts 
between the non-proliferation regime and North Korea since the 1990s. Although there 
have been major negotiations with North Korea over denuclearization, all attempts have 
either failed or achieved short-term results.  
A. PERCEPTION OF THREATS BY NORTH KOREA 
As a declining and extremely insular state, North Korea perceives threats both 
internally and externally. The authoritarian regime under the Kim family has had the odds 
of survival continuously stacked against it and is primarily concerned with its own security. 
The North’s attempt at forced reunification with the South in 1950 had failed. Following 
the Korean War, North Korea experienced a brief period of economic and industrial 
growth, just to find itself rapidly on the decline and increasingly in a semi-permanent 
defensive posture. Since then, the communist dictatorship in North Korea has watched its 
immediate neighbors—South Korea and China—flourish both politically and 
economically. South Korea became a democratic government and has risen in global status 
under the security provision from the United States’ nuclear umbrella as part of the U.S.-
South Korea mutual alliance. On the other hand, communist China is also steadily on the 
rise. Although some experts believe China’s economic growth is challenging the United 
States for global hegemony, it does not change the fact that China is economically 
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prospering.29 All the while, North Korea, unlike its regional neighbors, has been in a steady 
state of decline.  
Internally, the domestic conditions in the country are horrendous and therefore, 
potentially poses a threat to the Kim regime. In Kim Jung-Un’s 2018 New Year’s address, 
he wished families in North Korea, “good health, happiness, success and prosperity” and 
that this be the year where “the beautiful dreams of all our people, including the hopes of 
our children in the new year, would come true.”30 The irony of this sentiment is striking 
because under the dictatorship of Kim Jung-Un, the people of North Korea could never 
reach their full potential of health, happiness, success, and prosperity. Rather, Kim Jung-
Un’s family legacy has been to keep the North a withdrawn and insular state. North Korea 
is inundated by plights of famine and years of harsh economic sanctions, while the 
government continues to subside on the labors of its own people, often at the expense of 
significant human rights violations, and catering to the elite few. This strategy has not 
alleviated Kim Jung-Un of the internal domestic threat, but it has mitigated it because even 
with these atrocities, North Korea carries on.  
Externally, North Korea perceives the United States, South Korea, and China as 
threats. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korea has been solely responsible 
for its own security. The United States and South Korea represent a conventional and 
nuclear threat to North Korea and to the Kim regime’s security. China, though often linked 
to North Korea as a partner communist country, also represents a threat to North Korea 
because of their shared geographic border, China’s superior military, economic, and 
nuclear strength, and potential shared interest with South Korea and possibly the United 
States.  
To combat these external threats and continue the regime’s survival, Cha asserts 
one of the most significant reasons the regime has not collapsed or gone on the offensive 
 
29 “Tortoise v Hare; China and America,” The Economist, April 1, 2017, ProQuest Central. 
30 “New Year’s Address,” North Korea Leadership Watch, January 1, 2018, 
http://www.nkleadershipwatch.org/2018/01/01/new-years-address/. 
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is due to deterrence.31 One of North Korea’s stated goals has been reunification of the 
peninsula. However, North Korea’s conventional options for reunification are not 
promising. If it were to launch an attack south of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), as it did 
in 1950, it would result in certain disaster for North Korea and the Kim regime. The North 
is simply conventionally unmatched compared to the strength of the U.S.- South Korea 
alliance.32 The alliance’s response to an invasion would likely mean the end of the Kim 
Dynasty. This is something the Kim Family has known and considered. Therefore, North 
Korea is “deterred from a massive invasion because they know they would lose, and this 
rational calculation has been at the core of the peace on the DMZ.”33  
Regional and nuclear weapons experts tend to agree that the primary reason for 
developing and maintaining nuclear weapons is based on North Korea’s perception of 
threats to the regime’s survival. Joseph Cirincione concludes a crucial concern for North 
Korea is security.34 Therefore, the strategic conditions of North Korea make it prime for 
nuclear development.  
As a non-democratic state with an isolated economy, North Korea finds itself on 
the “periphery” of the international system, which is comprised of democratic states with 
globalized economies that do not have a significant security need for nuclear weapons.35 
Cirincione cited Glenn Chafetz’ finding of states on the periphery noting that these states 
“‘possess strong incentives to acquire or develop nuclear weapons’…they have much to 
gain and little to lose.”36 For the North, nuclear weapons increase the stakes for conflict, 
to a point that its adversaries will seek conflict avoidance instead. Van Jackson contends 
that nuclear weapons “limit what adversaries wishing to avoid nuclear war can do to North 
Korea. They increase the upper-end costs of misperception, miscalculation, and worst-case 
 
31 Victor Cha D., The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future, Updated Edition (New York: 
Ecco, 2018), 215. 
32 Cha, 216. 
33 Cha, 219. 
34 Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History & Future of Nuclear Weapons (New York and 
Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press, 2007), 53. 
35 Cirincione, 53. 
36 Cirincione, 53. 
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scenarios. They grant North Korea greater optionality in pursuing non-nuclear coercive 
violence, making North Korean offensives more difficult to predict, defend against, and 
deter.”37  
Beyond these security-oriented goals, nuclear weapons “may embolden North 
Korean officials to adopt more aggressive strategies in the pursuit of political goals.”38 It 
is North Korea’s perception that the survival of the Kim regime is under threat by both 
internal domestic and external international factors that drives it toward nuclear weapons 
for deterrence and assurance purposes. 
B. NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM HISTORY 
This section provides an overview of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program 
history. The program has actually been in existence for decades. Throughout North Korea’s 
history, the program has undergone periods of slow nuclear development interspersed with 
periods of increased attention and intensity. North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has 
largely been indigenous, but it has been the recipient of international assistance in the 
development of the program over its lifetime. However, it is the periods of intense research 
and development, largely without the help of any outside countries, that keeps North Korea 
in the spotlight for the United States. 
1. Nuclear Weapons Development 
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has held the United States’ interest for 
decades and it has continued to progress despite efforts to curtail or eliminate it. Before the 
Armistice took effect, North Korea had already indicated early interest in nuclear 
development when it formally established the Atomic Energy Research Institute and the 
Academy of Sciences in 1952.39 The nuclear program’s development was initially geared 
toward nuclear energy and relied on the North’s cooperation with the Soviet Union. This 
took the form of a nuclear energy cooperation agreement between the two countries which 
 
37 Jackson, On the Brink, 42. 
38 Jackson, 42. 
39 Nuclear Threat Initiative.  
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included groundbreaking on the North’s own nuclear research complex located in 
Yongbyon.40  
As the program progressed, North Korea did focus attention on general nuclear 
technical development and education, but by the 1960s, North Korea also explored 
broadening its nuclear program to include military purposes. Additionally, the nuclear 
effort began to transition more direct control to the top leadership, “although the cabinet 
and the Academy of Sciences were given operational and administrative oversight of the 
nuclear facilities, then-North Korea leader Kim Il Sung retained ultimate control of the 
nuclear program and all decisions associated with weapons development.”41 The 1970s 
and 1980s were periods of slow yet steady growth in North Korea’s nuclear program. 
During this period, the North began working on the key technology that makes nuclear 
weapons possible such as plutonium reprocessing, a nuclear bomb triggering mechanism, 
and uranium processing.42 Moreover, development in the 1980s was significant for two 
reasons. First, North Korea began research and design of a light water reactor (LWR), and 
second, in 1985 North Korea signed the NPT. 
LWR research and design was an important step in the North’s pursuit of a capable 
nuclear program. The LWR is the most popular type of power reactor in the world.43 In 
addition to the LWR, North Korea attained other nuclear power reactors, such as the five-
megawatt (5MWe) reactor at the nuclear complex in Yongbyon.44 The 5MWe reactor was 
completed in 1987 and was used to process plutonium; a necessary component for a nuclear 
weapon.45  
 
40 Nuclear Threat Initiative. 
41 Nuclear Threat Initiative.  
42 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “North Korea.“ 
43 “Nuclear 101: How Does a Nuclear Reactor Work?,” Office of Nuclear Energy, May 19, 2020, 
https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/nuclear-101-how-does-nuclear-reactor-work. 
44 “Yongbyon 5MWe Reactor,” Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), July 19, 2018, https://www.nti.org/
learn/facilities/766/. 
45 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Yongbyon 5MWe Reactor.”  
17 
However, while the North was pursuing a route to establish its own LWR, it was 
simultaneously agreeing to participate as a non-NWS under the NPT. Although, North 
Korea did sign the NPT, it did not agree to the additional nuclear safety protocols with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), rather the North “link [ed] adherence to this 
provision of the treaty to the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea.”46 In 
1991, the Bush Administration removed all tactical nuclear weapons from the Korean 
Peninsula and, in 1992, North Korea finally agreed to the IAEA’s additional 
comprehensive nuclear safeguard procedures.47 During an IAEA inspection, evidence of 
plutonium reprocessing was identified. This led to North Korea’s refusal to allow IAEA 
inspections to continue and the beginning of threats to withdraw from the NPT. Meanwhile, 
North Korea began clandestine plutonium reprocessing.48 Diplomatic action and 
negotiations between the United States and North Korea in the mid-1990s resulted in a 
moratorium in the plutonium reprocessing program, but ultimately it could not be 
sustained.49 At the turn of the century, the North’s nuclear proliferation efforts continued, 
resulting in its investment into a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program. Shortly after, in 
2003, North Korea officially withdrew from the NPT. 
Even amid nuclear negotiations with the United States and other countries (China, 
Japan, Russia, and South Korea), North Korea continued with nuclear weapons research 
and development. In 2006, North Korea conducted the first of six total nuclear tests; the 
last recorded test was in 2017 near the Punggye-ri nuclear test site. Each subsequent test 
showed an increase in nuclear yield. In the last test, North Korea proclaimed successful 
detonation of a hydrogen bomb, although experts believe “North Korea’s claim … cannot 
be independently substantiated, but the higher yield could be indicative of a boosted fission 
 
46 Alicia Sanders-Zakre, “Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” Arms 
Control, last modified June 2019, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron. 
47 Sanders-Zakre. 
48 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “North Korea.” 
49 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “North Korea.”  
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or thermonuclear device.”50 This further exemplifies North Korea’s relentless pursuit of 
nuclear weapons capabilities. 
2. Ballistic Missile Development 
In addition to nuclear weapons development, North Korea has been actively 
researching, designing, and testing ballistic missile capabilities as a means to deliver a 
weapon. As North Korea’s conventional capabilities age and become less reliable, North 
Korea began rigorously investing in the development of a ballistic missile program in the 
1960s.51 North Korea sought outside assistance to boost development. Initially, the Soviet 
Union and China declined the North’s request for support, until the Soviets eventually 
agreed to assist.52 Ultimately, the North’s cumulative proliferation partners included 
Egypt, Iran, Libya, and “possibly Syria and Pakistan.”53 
Flight testing of ballistic missiles is imperative to obtaining a fully operational 
inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of reaching the United States.54 Between 
1990–1993, under Kim Jung Il, North Korea conducted several tests of short and medium-
range ballistic missiles.55 After a brief period of no recorded missile testing, there was an 
intense period of testing from 2003–2009.56 Even during the series of denuclearization 
negotiations called the Six-Party Talks (2003-2009), North Korea continued with its 
missile program, conducting six tests in July 2006 alone.57 Kim Jung Il died in 2011, and 
with the regime transitioned under Kim Jung-Un, missile testing increased even more with 
 
50 Sanders-Zakre, “Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy.” 
51 “Missiles of North Korea,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 14, 
2018, last modified July 16, 2020, https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/dprk/. 
52 Miller and Narang, “North Korea Defied the Theoretical Odds: What Can We Learn from Its 
Successful Nuclearization?,” 60. 
53 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “North Korea.” 
54 Michael Elleman, “Why a Formal End to North Korean Missile Testing Makes Sense,” 38 North, 
February 26, 2019, https://www.38north.org/2019/02/melleman022619/. 
55 Elleman. 
56 Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Missiles of North Korea,” Missile Defense Project, 
July 16, 2020, https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/dprk/. 
57 Miller and Narang, “North Korea Defied the Theoretical Odds: What Can We Learn from Its 
Successful Nuclearization?,” 65. 
19 
the most activity between 2016–2017, consisting of more than forty tests flights in those 
two years alone. During this time, North Korea began testing the KN-11 submarine 
launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and in 2017, North Korea tested a new missile called 
the Pukguksong-2.58 From 2010-March 2020, there have been 117 ballistic missile tests 
conducted by North Korea.59 Figure 1 is a graphic representation of North Korea’s missile 
program’s evolution and overlays the approximate ranges of each missile on the map. 
 
Figure 1. Evolution of North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Program60 
The North’s nuclear program has greatly evolved since its 1950s origins. With little 
outside assistance, North Korea has come extraordinarily close to realizing its nuclear 
goals. Despite many challenges, North Korea has overcome the seemingly impossible and 
has proven that it may actually possess the capability of reaching United States’ territory. 
The most alarming feature of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program history has been its 
undeterred determination. North Korea’s continuous pursuit of nuclear weapons places the 
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non-proliferation regime in an increasingly challenging position because currently, “no 
country has ever given up an indigenously developed nuclear arsenal” that is as sizeable or 
advanced as North Korea’s.61  
C. STATUS OF NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM 
North Korea’s nuclear program makes it the ninth nuclear state in the world.62 
There are five NWSs under the NPT: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. The other four are non-NPT states: India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea. 
North Korea is the only non-NPT nuclear weapons state to have signed the NPT and then 
withdrawn. (North Korea officially withdrew from the NPT in 2003.) Some states, such as 
the United States and the United Kingdom, make information about their stockpiles public; 
others do not.63 In North Korea’s case, it has “acknowledged conducting nuclear weapon 
and missile tests but provides no information about its nuclear weapon capabilities.”64 The 
exact number of North Korea’s nuclear warheads is unknown; however, it is believed to 
have approximately 20–30 warheads.65 Siegfried S. Hecker of Stanford University, former 
Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, is one of few Americans who has been 
allowed to visit and observe portions of North Korea’s nuclear program. Following his 
2017 visit, Hecker estimated North Korea has enough plutonium and HEU, necessary 
materials to fuel a nuclear weapon, for “20 to 25 nuclear devices today [2017] and the 
capacity to produce an additional one every six to seven weeks.” 65F66 If extrapolated to today, 
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this would suggest North Korea has enough fissile material for approximately 100 nuclear 
devices, although most think tanks place their estimates at the aforementioned 20–30.   
Similarly, the North’s ballistic missile program is steadily advancing. The 
significant number of missile tests in the years under Kim Jung-Un demonstrate North 
Korea’s potential “ICBM capability, putting the U.S. homeland within striking distance.”67 
Moreover, “North Korea achieved this impressive progress in its nuclear and missile 
programs despite steadily increasing international sanctions pressure, including six rounds 
of U.N. sanctions and gradually escalating U.S. sanctions.”68 
D. NON-PROLIFERATION NEGOTIATION EFFORTS 
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has been a cause for concern by the United 
States since the mid-1980s, specifically following completion of the Yongbyon graphite 
reactor. At that time, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency reports expressed increasing 
concern over North Korea and its potential to pursue nuclear weapons, despite lacking 
definitive proof.69 Since then, every United States’ presidential administration has adopted 
an engagement or hardline strategy to counter nuclear proliferation in North Korea, 
beginning with President Reagan, whose strategy led to convincing North Korea to sign 
the NPT in 1985.70 Over the years, there have been several non-proliferation negotiations 
with North Korea. These have been a mixture of bilateral and multilateral efforts, with 
some achieving a modicum of success. However, none have achieved the U.S.’s ultimate 
goal of complete and total denuclearization of North Korea. To date, the most significant 
negotiations have been as follows: the Agreed Framework, the Six-Party talks, the Leap 
Day Agreement, and the United States-North Korea Denuclearization Summits.  
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The Agreed Framework was a multilateral nuclear deal led largely by the United 
States with North Korea. It was negotiated under the Clinton Administration and was in 
effect from 1994–2002. The major intent of the deal was to dismantle North Korea’s 
plutonium program by restricting North Korea’s access to nuclear materials in order to 
prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Within the Agreed Framework, “the 
U.S. agreed to arrange for North Korea to receive two light water reactor (LWR) nuclear 
power plants and heavy fuel oil in exchange for North Korea freezing and eventually 
dismantling its plutonium program under IAEA supervision.” 70F71 The parameters of the 
Agreed Framework deal encouraged North Korea to eventually give up its nuclear weapons 
program in return for United States energy assistance—the shipping of the heavy fuel oil 
and construction of the LWRs—lifting of sanctions, and improved relations with the United 
States. However, the Agreed Framework deal ultimately broke down during the Bush 
Administration. President Bush changed the direction of policy with North Korea and 
sought to apply stricter inspection criteria.71F72 Furthermore, the Administration claimed 
North Korea was cheating on the deal by operating a clandestine HEU program in violation 
of the “spirit” of the Agreed Framework.72F73 It resulted in the United States stopping the 
promised shipments and construction, and North Korea kicking out the IAEA inspectors, 
withdrawing from the NPT, and eventually starting up its reactor and reprocessing plant 
again.73F74 
Following the collapse of the Agreed Framework, the Six-Party Talks were a 
multilateral attempt at negotiating for denuclearization. The talks began in 2003 and 
continued intermittently until 2009. Representatives from the United States, North Korea, 
China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea (the P5+1) were included in the talks. These 
negotiations only proved to be marginally successful. For the United States, it entered into 
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the negotiations with the goal of advancing President Bush’s new policy of not accepting 
anything less from North Korea than complete, verifiable, and irreversible 
dismantlement.75 Jackson claims the CVID objective as part of the Six-Party Talks was 
“justifiable,” even if unlikely because it supported the overall goal of the negotiations—
denuclearization.76 CVID was the United States’ leading demand during these 
negotiations. Though the probability of attaining CVID was low to begin with, and never 
realized, there were some significant outcomes to the diplomacy. The crowning 
achievements of the Six-Party Talks were that it was the first “multilateral institution since 
1945 that dealt with security issues and involved all the key powers in Northeast Asia,” the 
first time North Korea publicly admitted that it had a nuclear weapons program, and the 
September 2005 Joint Statement promised the denuclearization of North Korea which 
resulted in some actionable objectives such as the dismantlement of some critical 
components of the nuclear weapons program.77 However, the talks were ultimately 
abandoned in 2009 following North Korea’s flagrant violation of the commitments made 
during the talks to include North Korea’s successful nuclear test and its unwillingness to 
agree to any IAEA dismantlement verification procedures.78 Furthermore, even though the 
North did take some actionable dismantlement steps under the Six-Party Talks such as, the 
destruction of the Yongbyon nuclear complex cooling tower, Jackson asserts that the action 
itself had “no meaningful effect on its [North Korea’s] ability to produce nuclear weapons, 
but the symbolism seemed meaningful at the time.”79 
Then, under the Obama Administration, the United States and North Korea signed 
the Leap Day Agreement on February 29, 2012. This deal was an effort to resume where 
the Six-Party Talks ended however, this agreement was short lived and failed to achieve 
much. Both sides were reluctant to call these proceedings a negotiation, but instead referred 
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to the discourse as “high-level talks.”80 The statements made by both sides were wrought 
with vague and conflicting language that doomed the agreement from the start.81 Jackson 
observes that the United States’ strategy behind the agreement was fundamentally flawed. 
Upon embarking on the Leap Day Agreement he states, “the Obama administration ha [d] 
not been clear-eyed about why prior agreements with North Korea had failed.”82 
Furthermore, he concludes, “the result was the end of the Leap Day Deal, no justifiable 
theory of the case for a diplomatic approach to attaining CVID, and a newly deep reservoir 
of bad faith and cynicism among U.S. officials.”83 This analysis suggests that one of the 
main causal factors to the negotiation’s failure had to do with a fundamental issue of a 
policy based on CVID that lacked significant diplomatic measures to achieve it. 
The Trump administration’s bilateral United States-North Korea summits were the 
last significant negotiation efforts aimed at denuclearization to date. Two summits were 
held between President Trump and Kim Jung-Un. The Trump Administration’s 
engagement strategy culminated in what was labeled as “maximum pressure” and, most 
importantly, the objective of the negotiations continued to pursue CVID. The outcome of 
the first summit in 2018 in Singapore, resulted in a joint declaration between the leaders 
that promised to: further United States-North Korea relations, pursue peace on the 
peninsula, return the remains of U.S. Prisoners of War/Missing in Action, and to work 
toward the denuclearization of the North. However, it provided no details on what actions 
will be to be taken to achieve these objectives or measures of success. Furthermore, with 
little in return, the U.S. conceded to temporarily cancel future combined U.S.-South Korean 
military exercises.84 Looking to build off the Singapore summit, the second summit was 
held in Vietnam in 2019. An agreement between the two leaders was highly anticipated, 
but the summit unexpectedly concluded early, without an agreement. President Trump later 
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commented on the summit, saying, “they wanted the sanctions lifted in their entirety, and 
we couldn ’t do that. They were willing to denuke a large portion of the areas that we 
wanted, but we couldn’t give up all the sanctions for that.”84F85 Approximately two months 
later, Kim Jung-Un met with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and then, on May 4, 2019, 
North Korea conducted a rocket test and launched a short-range ballistic missile, the first 
provocations in over a year. 
It is unclear what exactly caused North Korea to participate in the denuclearization 
summits. It may have been because of the maximum pressure campaign or because Kim 
Jung-Un viewed this as an opportunity to pursue his own agenda. Either way, there was 
détente in that timeframe during which zero provocations occurred and it undeniably 
highlights the noticeable change in North Korea’s behavior. However, as witnessed with 
the preceding denuclearization efforts dating back to the 1980s, the extended period of 
détente and North Korea’s concessions did not last again. The leading requirement by the 
United States in these four significant denuclearization efforts emphasized both a freeze-
for-freeze strategy or the principal objective of CVID. Is continuing to push CVID as the 
United States’ leading terms in denuclearization negotiations the best strategy or are there 
alternate strategies that could achieve long term, successful results? 
E. CONCLUSION 
Any policy toward North Korea, whether it is CVID or something else, requires a 
solid and consensus understanding of the capabilities and the purposes of the nuclear 
weapons program. The secretive nature of North Korea’s program is problematic, as one 
cannot know with absolute certainty what the regime’s intentions for the program are, but 
for policymaking and scholarly forecasting and study, it is imperative to consider the 
aspects that were examined within this chapter: perception of threats by North Korea, its 
nuclear weapons program history and status, and, finally, a review of non-proliferation 
negotiation efforts. 
 




What does North Korea view as its threats? The answer to this question could reveal 
the possible motivations for its nuclear weapons program. The drivers for nuclear 
proliferation are examined in greater detail in Chapter III, but for the purposes of assessing 
the North’s nuclear weapons program, the key link between North Korea and its nuclear 
weapons program is the need for regime survival. North Korea’s proximity to South Korea, 
who is allied with the United States—a conventional and nuclear superpower—gives North 
Korea reason to fear for the regime’s security. A nuclear North Korea potentially ensures 
the survival of the Kim Dynasty. Furthermore, nuclear policy toward North Korea must 
consider its nuclear history and the current status of its weapons program. North Korea 
may not be an officially recognized NWS or an NPT participant, but it is a de facto nuclear 
weapons state. The Kim regime has been developing its nuclear weapons program for 
nearly 70 years and scholars believe that it possesses at least a small arsenal of nuclear 
warheads. Moreover, the missile tests in 2017 have demonstrated that it may have or may 
be rapidly nearing the ability to reach United States territory.86 
Lastly, an accurate evaluation of current policy and possible recommendations for 
future policy need to be formulated with the knowledge of previous non-proliferation 
negotiation efforts and its results. This review identified that there have been four 
significant negotiation efforts made to either restrain the North’s nuclear proliferation or 
to completely denuclearize it. Many of these efforts have been marginally successful in 
certain areas however, the fact the United States is still dealing with a nuclear North Korea 
that is advancing its capabilities indicates that the results have not been long-lasting. The 
approaches to negotiations and the desired outcomes have been varied, but this review has 
shown that when it comes to dealing with North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, there 
is no one-size fits all solution to this problem. 
Chapter III will examine nuclear proliferation as a concept, looking at the drivers 
and inhibitors for proliferation and non-proliferation. Additionally, the chapter will include 
a comparative study in order to ascertain possible similarities and differences between the 
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cases in the study and North Korea. The study will include a comparison between select 
cases of states with nuclear weapons and states who have had them and then elected to give 
them up. This comparative study’s findings could help to identify whether a policy the 
demands CVID upfront from North Korea is the best option. 
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III. NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION 
North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons almost seems counterintuitive. Nuclear 
weapons are so destructive that NWSs go to great lengths to prevent their usage and limit 
proliferation. North Korea pursues nuclear weapons, but should it ever use one offensively 
against the United States or an ally of the United States, it would certainly result in a 
retaliatory strike that would decimate North Korea and the Kim regime. Why, then, does 
North Korea or, for that matter, any state pursue nuclear weapons programs at the risk of 
total devastation? It is reasonable to think that most states do not want to be on the receiving 
end of a nuclear weapon, therefore, one must consider the other factors driving states to 
proliferate and conversely, what inhibits proliferation. 
This thesis focused on five primary factors driving states to acquire nuclear 
weapons: security, prestige, domestic politics, technology, and economics.87 Cirincione 
contends that most states will consider one or more of these factors when making decisions 
about nuclear weapons. Among these five factors, economics is rarely the sole motivator 
but is more often combined with one of the other four factors.88 If a state is looking to 
prosper and profit in any or all of these five areas; then it seems rather surprising that more 
states do not pursue nuclear weapons programs. To account for what inhibits proliferation, 
Cirincione also claims states use the same five drivers as reasons for non-proliferation.89 
In other words,  
states decide to not build nuclear weapons—or, in some cases, to give up 
weapons they have acquired or programs that they have started—because 
they decide that the security benefits are greater without nuclear weapons, 
or that prestige is enhanced by non-nuclear-weapon status, or because 
domestic politics convinces leaders not to pursue these programs, or 
 
87 Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History & Future of Nuclear Weapons (New York and 
Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press, 2007), 47. Although other authors parse motivations 
slightly differently, it is my assessment that this framing is the most useful as it broadly encapsulates the 
main sources of states’ behavior. 
88 Cirincione, 48. 
89 Cirincione, 48. 
30 
because the technological and economic barriers are too significant to 
overcome.90  
In sum, these drivers are also inhibitors. The drivers work to pull countries toward 
nuclear weapons, while the inhibitors push countries away from them. 
This chapter proceeds in two main sections. In the first section, outside of 
Cirincione’s theory, I analyze what drives states to acquire nuclear weapons and reversely, 
what factors inhibit states. I argue that states tend to weigh its unique domestic 
determinants, international factors, and material constraints when considering whether to 
proliferate, and that those considerations closely align to Cirincione’s five drivers and 
inhibitors. In the second section, I present a comparative study of successful and failed 
denuclearization cases. The case study reveals four major findings. First, domestic 
determinants are the most common driver of proliferation decisions. Second, international 
factors are relevant to proliferation decisions, but are not as prevalent. Third, material 
constraints influence proliferation decisions to a lesser degree than the other two categories. 
Fourth, there are multiple pathways to denuclearization. The identification of similarities 
and differences between the proliferation drivers and inhibitors of eight countries in this 
chapter (and in Chapter IV) will be subsequently applied to North Korea. Future 
denuclearization policy must incorporate North Korea’s nuclear proliferation drivers and 
inhibitors as will be discussed in the ensuing chapter.  
A. DRIVERS AND INHIBITORS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION  
Understanding what drives countries to seek nuclear weapons and what restrains 
them is complicated, but scholars claim there are common drivers and inhibitors among 
nuclear and non-nuclear states. Cirincione’s theory supports that claim and argues there are 
five drivers of nuclear proliferation: security, prestige, domestic politics, technology and 
economics.91 He further argues that these same five drivers are also inhibitors of nuclear 
weapons proliferation.  
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Cirincione’s theory can be further consolidated into three broad categories: 
domestic determinants, international factors, and material constraints. This theory does not 
refute Cirincione’s, but builds upon it, by offering a more concise way of illustrating what 
influences decision-makers’ choices regarding nuclear weapons proliferation. For 
example, a heavy influence in either direction in any one of the categories—domestic and 
international factors or material constraint—may prove to be the critical tipping point of 
proliferation or non-proliferation decisions.  
1. Domestic Determinants 
The domestic factors within a given state will be a determinant for driving or 
inhibiting nuclear weapons proliferation. They can be either broad or narrow in scope. The 
first consideration is for broad political and economic issues. Several academics such as 
Sagan, Solingen and Saunders claim proliferation are a result of significant broad political 
and economic issues. Proliferation decisions are often a result of the state’s domestic actors, 
for example political and military leaders, and their motivations for influencing a given 
country to attain nuclear weapons or to prevent it.92 Additionally, a state’s desire for 
globalization influences proliferation decisions. States that want integration into the global 
economy are less likely to proliferate. Meanwhile, states that “reject internationalization 
… have greater incentives to exploit nuclear weapons.”93 Finally, states consider 
proliferation decisions based on “the degree of threat uncertainty,” and how that affects 
domestic politics and nuclear policy.94 
On the other hand, determinants may include narrow domestic, political, and 
economic issues. Jacques E.C. Hymans asserts a state’s domestic “veto players” position 
on nuclear policy will influence proliferation decisions. Veto players are individual or 
grouped decision-makers who can alter a state’s nuclear policy. Players may be domestic 
 
92 Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?,” 63. 
93 Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2007), 5, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/
detail.action?docID=445551. 
94 Elizabeth N. Saunders, “The Domestic Politics of Nuclear Choices—A Review Essay,” 
International Security 44, no. 2 (October 2019): 150, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00361. 
32 
actors, such as politicians, or may consist of government institutions, bureaucracies and 
private industry. Hymans contends that it takes the agreement of a state’s veto players to 
make significant change in nuclear policy.95 Furthermore, there seems to be a direct 
correlation between the number of veto players and proliferation. He argues that “the more 
institutionalized veto players [are] in a given country, the less likely that any subtle political 
shifts will lead suddenly to the state ’s acquisition of nuclear weapons.”95F96 In sum, the larger 
the number of veto players, the less likely a state will be to proliferate because agreement 
among the players is difficult to achieve. 96F97 
2. International Factors 
Similarly, international factors affecting a state can influence decisions about 
nuclear weapons. International factors may include concerns over the state’s threat 
perceptions. Sagan’s “security model” exemplifies how threat perceptions lead to decisions 
to proliferate nuclear weapons. The security model implies that states will proliferate to 
“increase [their] national security against foreign threats.”98 In other words, if a state 
perceives an outside threat, in order to ensure its security, the state may decide in favor of 
proliferation.  
Moreover, states may also elect to proliferate nuclear weapons when it harbors 
alliance concerns. Alexander Lanoszka argues when one state fears abandonment from an 
ally, that state will be more likely to attempt proliferation. Additionally, he claims that a 
security agreement between alliances, while helpful, is not enough to prevent an ally from 
pursuing nuclear weapons, but rather “alliances are more effective in deterring potential 
[emphasis added] nuclear proliferation than in curbing actual cases of nuclear 
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proliferation.”99 Therefore, he concludes that alliances need to reassure partners of their 
security commitments through other means, such as, conventional military commitments 
or through economic and technological provisions.100 
3. Material Constraints 
A state’s material constraints, such as access to technology and organic technical 
capability, may also influence nuclear decisions. States tend to support nuclear 
proliferation when it has a robust technological capacity.101 On the other hand, nuclear 
capabilities can be negatively affected when the state lacks the ability to foster its own 
technological prowess and through restrictions levied by international institutions. In light 
of this reality, the non-proliferation regime has intentionally made technological 
advancement of nuclear weapons programs difficult, especially for illicit programs. The 
regime’s efforts have increased security and scrutiny of suspected nuclearizing countries. 
Therefore, it has kept the total number of nuclear weapons states at status quo over the 
years, showing the correlation between technology and proliferation; technological 
restraint on a state lowers proliferation. However, this is not the only way to induce material 
constraints, the level of innate technological capability is significant to proliferation 
decisions. Einhorn asserts that “even if states gain access to the necessary nuclear 
equipment, materials, and technology, those countries with a limited technological and 
industrial base will find the path to nuclear weapons long, challenging, and uncertain.”102 
Material constraints from within may force countries to look internationally for assistance, 
but while the initiative to acquire nuclear weapons may be present, attaining outside help 
does not necessarily always lead to a capable nuclear weapons program. 
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4. Conclusion 
There is no mathematical formula to predict which drivers or inhibitors or 
combination thereof will lead a state to nuclear proliferation or to non-proliferation. Sagan 
appropriately concludes that decisions to proliferate are generally complex and 
multicausal.103 As difficult as it may be to forecast or interpret a country’s proliferation 
choices, certain domestic determinants, international factors, and material constraints tend 
to heavily influence proliferation decisions. The following case study compares eight 
countries; three with active nuclear programs and five with inactive weapons programs. 
This section details several variables within each of the three broad proliferation categories. 
In the case study comparison, I ascertain whether any variables of the proliferation 
categories are present and to what degree. Ultimately, the comparison of each of these 
countries supports the consensus of many scholars who believe that countries choose to 
proliferate nuclear weapons based on a variety of drivers and individual circumstances. 
Furthermore, the study’s findings indicate that the drivers and inhibitors of nuclear 
weapons programs are based predominantly on whether a state believes nuclear weapons 
support its primary interests. 
B. CASE STUDY 
Building on these approaches, in this study, I compare eight different states—
China, South Africa, India, South Korea, Libya, Iran, Egypt, and Taiwan—to identify 
which drivers or inhibitors influence proliferation decisions. The results of this 
comparative study are consistent with the findings of scholars, such as Scott Sagan, in that 
states make nuclear weapons proliferation choices based on a complex integration of many 
factors. The study’s three major findings are discussed in Part B, Section 3 “Case Study 
Observations and Findings.” The outcome indicates that North Korea’s proliferation 
decisions likely take into account one or more proliferation drivers. As a result, the current 
U.S. foreign policy enforcing CVID may not be a viable option to achieve denuclearization 
if North Korea’s particular nuclear proliferation drivers and inhibitors are not addressed. 
 
103 Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?,” 85. 
35 
1. Case Study Design 
Other scholars have completed similar comparative studies regarding proliferation 
but sought to prove different research questions and utilized different cases in the studies. 
For example, Bleek’s 2017 study uses all known proliferation cases over time. His 
objective is to document their proliferation histories and codify each country’s proliferation 
behaviors.104 Solingen’s 2007 book compares a number of selected East Asian and Middle 
Eastern countries to analyze what influences proliferation decisions. She focuses on the 
influence internal security and global economic factors have on proliferation. The design 
for this theses’ comparative case study considers the project’s scope, size, and inclusion of 
a variety of key characteristics. Of the 31 countries who have taken initial steps to develop 
nuclear weapons programs, I selected eight.105 Limiting the comparison to eight countries 
contains the scope and size of the study appropriate for this thesis, but through careful case 
selection, does not sacrifice the inclusion of variety in the study.  
The cases are a broad sampling of locations with circumstantial situations and 
cultural influences both similar and different from North Korea’s. Table 1 illustrates seven 
characteristics and how they vary among the cases. This study includes countries selected 
from three main regions of the world: Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. With the sample 
cases originating from all over these three regions, their geo-political situations vary. A 
country’s security situation changes based on location and its proximity to other regional 
actors who may or may not be a substantial threat. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per 
capita (using purchasing power parity exchange rates, or PPP) is indicative of how much 
money an individual in a given country is making off of the country’s economic output and 
also of the country’s standard of living quality. Furthermore, there may be a correlation 
between high PPP and government type. In this study, the only countries with PPP above 
$30,000 are Taiwan and South Korea. A country’s wealth and its decision to maintain a 
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nuclear weapons program does not always make logical financial sense because nuclear 
weapons programs are expensive. In other words, one would expect poorer countries to 
abstain from expensive nuclear weapons programs. If the GDP per capita is low, then the 
country’s overall economic output per its entire population is low as well. However, in this 
study, most of the sample countries with low PPP, and even some with higher PPP, do not 
have active nuclear weapons programs indicating that there is not always a correlation 
between wealth, government type, and nuclear weapons program decisions. Meanwhile, 
ethnicity and religion are characteristics included to depict just how diverse the sample 
cases truly are. Despite the cases’ diversity in ethnicity and religion, some states still 
elected to denuclearize, indicating that level of diversity may only be a marginal factor in 
proliferation decisions. As previously mentioned, the sample cases also have great variety 
in government type. This characteristic was highlighted to show that there is not a direct 
relationship between government type and nuclear weapons decisions. Although it is 
possible that government type may have an indirect influence on a country’s perception of 
its national security which may affect decisions driving toward or inhibiting nuclear 
weapons proliferation. Finally, the most important aspect of this study is that the selected 
cases are a mix of states with active nuclear weapons programs and states that gave up the 
quest for nuclear weapons or fully capable nuclear weapons programs. 
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Table 1. Comparative Case Characteristics106 
 
 
2. Case Study Analysis 
This section provides the analysis for each case. Each country’s nuclear history was 
examined for evidence of the three proliferation drivers and inhibitors. 
I. China. Research into the China case revealed nuclear proliferation decision-
making may have been strongly influenced through varying degrees of domestic 
determinants and international factors. Domestically, both the desire of political leaders 
and the people’s popular opinion to be a viable contender in a nuclear world, greatly 
influenced the direction of China’s nuclear program.107 Additionally, international factors 
such as China’s perceived security situation, acted as a proliferation driver. China’s view 
of predominant security threats included the United States, the Soviet Union, and other 
regional nuclear developments taking place (such as India).108 Interestingly, China does 
not have any naturally occurring material constraints. However, China has allegedly 
manifested certain material constraints in financial and technological areas over the years, 
in order to manage the program and align it according to its strategic preferences. For 
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instance, from a fiscal perspective, China has consistently prioritized other areas of 
expenditure over national defense and, subsequently, over nuclear modernization.109 A 
2017 RAND study on China’s nuclear deterrence estimated that national defense accounted 
for only 1.32 percent of China’s GDP, quite low considering China’s economic surge 
particularly between 1980–1989.110 Furthermore, China reduced its fissile material 
reprocessing capabilities through the closure of an already small number of national 
reprocessing facilities.111 Yet, China’s ability to maintain a viable nuclear weapons 
program is undeterred by the conscience reduction of fissile material. Rather, these 
manufactured material constraints present more of a challenge to the total amount of 
nuclear weapons China’s arsenal can support than to the continuation of the nuclear 
weapons program itself.  
Finally, the China case is valuable to this study because of the similarities it has 
with North Korea. Specifically, China is an East Asia country, it generally maintains an 
adversarial relationship with the U.S., and has an active nuclear weapons program as does 
North Korea. However, unlike North Korea, China’s program is officially recognized as 
one of five NWSs. These similarities, in terms of geopolitical and weapons statuses, offer 
an insight into China’s and North Korea’s potential nuclear proliferation drivers. 
II. South Africa. The strongest evidence available suggests that domestic 
determinants and international factors may have significantly influenced South Africa’s 
initial decision to proliferate and later, to reverse that decision. Initial domestic issues 
include both a desire to explore nuclear power, at first for mining purposes, followed by 
influential political leaders who expanded South Africa’s nuclear capabilities toward 
weaponization.112 Additionally, international factors favored South Africa’s nuclear 
proliferation because in the 1970s it started to perceive its security situation deteriorating.  
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On the other hand, South Africa is a case where domestic determinants and 
international factors are working as both proliferation drivers and inhibitors. Both of these 
factors may be at least partially responsible for South Africa’s decision to dismantle the 
nuclear weapons program in 1990. This time, the domestic variables influencing non-
proliferation were again South Africa’s influential political leaders who were now 
responding to a new domestic variable: the transformation from an apartheid government 
to a new system of government. Upon the new government’s re-evaluation of the 
international factors, the new president, Nelson Mandela, assessed South Africa’s security 
to no longer be improved through the ongoing possession of a nuclear weapons 
program.113 Lastly, the evidence does not suggest material constraints acted as either 
significant drivers or inhibitors of nuclear weapons.  
South Africa is an interesting case because it differs from North Korea 
geographically, politically, culturally, and in current proliferation status. South Africa 
demonstrated two out of three proliferation drivers and inhibitors. This is notable because 
despite South Africa’s and North Korea’s many differences, at one point, their proliferation 
status was the same. Bleek’s study claims South Africa acquired nuclear weapons in 1979, 
then completely denuclearized its nuclear program in 1991, and it remains inactive to this 
day.114 If policymakers can identify similar proliferation drivers between South Africa and 
North Korea, they could also look at South Africa’s proliferation inhibitors to isolate any 
similarities with North Korea in order to exploit the same inhibitors that lead to South 
Africa’s denuclearization. Although, the core factor seems to be a radical change in 
domestic government structure, and ideology, which unfortunately sets a high bar for 
resolving the North Korea problem with the same strategy used with South Africa. 
III. India. Research into India’s nuclear history finds evidence of all three 
proliferation drivers influencing nuclear decision-makers. First, India’s domestic 
determinants are likely to have been, and continue to be, quite influential in proliferation 
decisions. Perkovich, Abraham, and Bleek claim domestic civilian actors, such as high-
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ranking politicians, strongly influenced the development of India’s nuclear weapons 
program.115 Comparably, Cirincione indicates India’s high-level bureaucrats as additional 
influential actors.116 India’s civil-military relationship over nuclear weapons is a key 
component to proliferation. Moreover, India’s civil-military relationship is intriguing and 
appears to have some similarities with the democratic system in the United States. Sagan 
expands on how the civil-military relationship affects the nuclear weapons program. He 
describes it as “an extreme system” where there has been “very little direct military 
influence on any aspect of nuclear weapons policy,” with the overwhelming majority of 
nuclear decisions under civilian control.117 Second, India’s international factors included 
evidence of a strong perception of regional security threats from adversaries such as 
Pakistan118and China.119 To complicate matters, India perceived the U.S. as favoring both 
of those countries over India.120 As a result, domestic nuclear advocates theorized that a 
capable nuclear weapons program would provide India increased regional security by 
deterring “sub-conventional and conventional aggression” from Pakistan and China.121 
Finally, India faced material constraint challenges in its nuclear weapons program 
development. To compensate, it acquired international assistance to realize certain 
technological and infrastructural achievements.122 Furthermore, full acquirement status of 
the nuclear weapons program was delayed by several years for a deficiency in suitable 
delivery system capabilities.123  
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India is a compelling study because it is another case with an active nuclear 
weapons program, although this case is not officially recognized as an NWS, and even 
though it an Asian country, it has few similarities with North Korea. Geographically, India 
is located in south-central Asia, and this distance accounts to a large degree for India and 
North Korea’s different adversaries. Politically, India and North Korea are different as 
well. India has a democratic-type government as opposed to North Korea’s authoritarian 
government which leads to the different philosophies in nuclear command and control. 
India’s nuclear programs are civilian run, with little military influence, whereas North 
Korea, is on the other end of the scale with Kim Jung-Un presumably exerting full 
command and control. In the case of India and the United States, the civilian-military 
relationship exists as it does because it is a security measure for proper checks and balances 
on the nuclear weapons program. Whereas in North Korea, all authority and decision-
making for nuclear weapons falls to one individual. Societally, India and North Korea are 
also very polarized. While North Korea is a distinctly homogenous people, India is a 
melting pot of ethnicities, languages, and religions. However, despite these differing 
characteristics, India and North Korea are both states with active nuclear weapons 
programs. For all their differences, their similarities likely reside in their proliferation 
drivers. U.S. policymakers should pay particular attention to these similar proliferation 
drivers and consider what policy mechanisms have been put in place to limit India’s nuclear 
proliferation, and what, if any of the same mechanisms, can be applied to North Korea. 
IV. South Korea. The evidence shows South Korea’s proliferation and eventual 
non-proliferation decisions were influenced predominantly by domestic determinants and 
international factors. Government leaders led South Korea’s exploration and pursuit of 
nuclear weapons based on international factors.124 In the late 1960s, South Korea 
perceived an increasing security threat as the U.S. withdrew some of the military forces 
previously stationed on the peninsula in the context of a deteriorating Vietnam War.125 
Domestic actors in South Korea feared U.S. abandonment and vectored toward establishing 
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a nuclear weapons program.126 While domestic determinants and international factors led 
to proliferation, South Korea was unhampered by material constraints in its pursuit of 
nuclear weapons. In the end, South Korea’s proliferation reversal stemmed largely from 
international pressure from the U.S. to cease its pursuit of nuclear weapons. South Korea 
finally ended its nuclear program in 1981.127  
South Korea is an essential case selection because it is North Korea’s twin as 
cohabitor of the Korean peninsula. Together they share an indigenous heritage and 
language, but since partition, have developed opposing governments as well as differing 
cultures and societies. While South Korea never completely acquired nuclear weapons, it 
did rigorously pursue a weapons program.128 However, like South Africa, South Korea 
eventually reversed its proliferation decision. Though for South Korea, the decision to 
reverse and dismantle its nuclear weapons program was more influenced by international 
factors. U.S. policymakers must consider the strong sense of abandonment South Korea’s 
government felt in the late 1960s and avoid policy decisions involving North Korea’s 
nuclear program that would recreate this fear of abandonment by our South Korean ally 
again. 
V. Libya. Research into Libya’s nuclear proliferation history shows evidence for 
all three proliferation drivers and inhibitors. Domestically, Libya’s political leaders’ desire 
for nuclear weapons acted as a strong catalyst to proliferation. Etel Solingen shrewdly 
identifies the distinctions in proliferation motivations between Libya’s domestic actors. 
While Libya’s political leaders may have alluded to nuclear weapons providing security 
for Libya and balancing power in the region, it is more likely that nuclear weapons served 
as Qadhafi’s “regime security rather than state security.”129 Therefore, a large part of the 
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reason why nuclear weapons were acquired in Libya was to satisfy the personal ambitions 
of domestic actors. 
The degree to which international factors played a role in proliferation decisions is 
more mixed. In this case, international factors are more likely to have been a proliferation 
inhibitor versus a driver, eventually leading to Libya’s denuclearization. Pressure on Libya 
by the U.S. to denuclearize was incentivized with sanctions relief coupled with the promise 
of improved “relations with the U.S. and internationally.”130 
Prior to Libya’s decision to reverse course, it was burdened with significant 
material constraints. In an effort to overcome material constraints and move its weapons 
program along, Libya sought to purchase nuclear weapons from several countries, tried to 
get fissile material through military engagement with a foreign country,131 and became 
entangled in the A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network.132 Libya is one of the most 
affected by material constraints in this study. However, the most significant inhibitor was 
actually from domestic and international factors, and not material constraints. By the late 
1990s and following the U.S.’s invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, Libya began to view 
nuclear proliferation differently.133 For Qaddafi, after seeing what the U.S. was doing in 
the Middle East, he started to perceive nuclear weapons as an impediment to regime 
security. One scholar succinctly described Qaddafi’s analysis as an exercise in weighing 
“the increasing costs and risks of nuclear proliferation (both in direct political terms)” and 
finally reaching “the conclusion that Libya can gain little by becoming a nuclear weapons 
state.”134 
Libya is a case whose government at one point most resembled North Korea’s. 
Though different, the Qaddafi-run authoritarian government was in many ways similar to 
North Korea’s. The international gains that denuclearization promised was enough of an 
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inhibitor to convince Qaddafi to abandon the nuclear weapons program. Cirincione notes 
one benefit to Libya denuclearizing was as increase in international prestige, citing 
President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair’s public recognition of 
Qaddafi’s decision to denuclearize “as ‘a model’ that other leaders should emulate.”135 
However, the comparisons between Qaddafi and model leadership stop at the decision to 
denuclearize Libya. Much as the Kim regime is, Qaddafi has been accused of “systematic 
violations of human rights, including aggressions carried out against civilians both in Libya 
and abroad.”136 In 2011, Qaddafi was executed by rebel forces during the NATO-backed 
Arab Spring intervention.137 There is ongoing debate about whether Qaddafi’s 
surrendering of Libya’s nuclear weapons program was a necessary step in ending his 
regime, if Kim Jung-Un has made this correlation, and if he would view a similar Libya-
style deal as the beginning of the end of his regime.138 However, if Kim Jung-Un desires 
global recognition and prestige, than U.S. policymakers may be able to use some of the 
same diplomatic strategies with North Korea that were used with Libya to achieve 
denuclearization results. 
VI. Iran. Research into Iran’s nuclear history finds evidence of all three 
proliferation drivers influencing nuclear decision-makers in a similar manner to India. 
First, Iran showed evidence of domestic determinants from political leaders, although 
support for or against nuclear weapons programs varied throughout the 1970s and 1980s. 
As a result, the program repeatedly started and stopped during that time.139 Additionally, 
Iran’s intent for a nuclear weapons program fluctuated. On the one hand, sometimes Iran 
professed a peaceful intent for a nuclear program, indicating proliferation restraint. On the 
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other, it would advocate for a weaponized program to improve things such as “national 
pride, prestige, nationalism, [and] cultural factors” within Iran.140 Second, evidence shows 
that international factors influenced Iran’s proliferation. In the beginning, Iran’s perceived 
security threat from Iraq first drove proliferation. Later, institutional restraints enforced on 
Iran by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for IAEA infractions hampered the 
nuclear weapons program.141 Ultimately, the non-proliferation regime negotiated a 
multilateral nuclear deal called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) which 
limited Iran’s nuclear capabilities and proliferation. Finally, Iran had chronic issues with 
material constraints in certain areas such as technological knowledge; impacting Iran’s 
ability to reprocess fissile material.142 Cirincione uses Iran to exemplify the impact 
material constraints could have on nuclear proliferation claiming the more technical 
barriers placed on a country then “the more difficult it is for other nations to pursue nuclear 
weapons quickly or successfully.” Such is the case with Iran. 
Iran is a great comparison study with North Korea. The cases are similar because 
they both have active nuclear programs and, at one point, the non-proliferation regime took 
similar diplomatic measures for each, negotiating the 2015 JCPOA with Iran and the 1994 
Agreed Framework with North Korea. The key points of the JCPOA are that it does not 
denuclearize Iran but limits its nuclear capabilities while addressing many of Iran’s 
interests. All without divesting Iran of its entire nuclear program. For these reasons, the 
agreement is appealing. The JCOPA is still in existence but is less stable since the U.S. 
withdrew from the deal. The major focus of the Agreed Framework was the restriction of 
nuclear material via the dismantlement North Korea’s plutonium program to prevent 
further proliferation. In exchange, the U.S. agreed to “the establishment of better political 
relations and the lifting of economic sanctions.”143 Additionally, both Iran and North 
Korea have been signed to the NPT. The areas were the cases differ are in the development 
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status of nuclear weapons and the outcomes of the non-proliferation deals. Political and 
academic estimates vastly agree that North Korea’s nuclear program has developed nuclear 
weapon devices, but the general consensus is that Iran’s nuclear program has not developed 
weapons, but is not far from this achievement.144 Furthermore, Iran remains under the NPT 
while North Korea withdrew from it in 2003. North Korea’s withdrawal vice Iran’s 
continued agreement to it, offers the world better visibility on Iran’s nuclear program and 
is a signal of a potentially more stable commitment to adhering to the promises it has made 
the non-proliferation regime. 
Scholars continue to debate the success of the Agreed Framework and the JCPOA. 
Therefore, one can question whether either deal is an ideal model to apply to North Korea 
today. One argument claims the Agreed Framework is a failure because it ultimately broke 
down, thus the U.S., and the rest of the world should not expect the JCPOA to succeed 
either.145 Another argument claims that the Agreed Framework was actually a success 
despite its demise and if the lessons learned from the Agreed Framework period are 
applied, the JCPOA could turn out to be a contemporary success.146 Considering both 
deals and looking at North Korea today, if denuclearization is the goal, then using the 
Agreed Framework and the JCPOA as a model is not likely to achieve that goal outright 
because they were both written to contain nuclear proliferation as the objective. In this 
regard, both deals account for the other party’s interest and include incentives in the form 
of concessions for the proliferating country, giving each motivation for agreeing and 
adhering to the limitations and restrictions placed on the nuclear programs. The Agreed 
Framework and JCPOA could eventually lead to denuclearization, but that should be the 
long-term goal, not the short-term one. This case illustrates that focusing on North Korea’s 
proliferation drivers and inhibitors, as with Iran, could make future policy more successful.  
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VII. Egypt. Egypt is somewhat unique to this study. The evidence shows that 
domestic determinants, international factors, and material constraints were major inhibitors 
of nuclear proliferation. First, domestic determinants were clearly influential in Egypt’s 
non-proliferation choices. Egypt’s political leaders are partially responsible for both 
driving, and later, inhibiting its nuclear weapons program.147 Additional domestic 
determinants included internal bureaucratic issues and significant financial issues.148 
Moreover, domestic political actors applied internal pressure to eventually move Egypt to 
sign the NPT.149 Second, this study finds evidence of international factors that support 
Egypt’s early drive toward proliferation. Bleek states Egypt displayed an increased 
motivation for beginning its nuclear weapons program as a result of a perceived regional 
security threat, specifically after Israel showed signs of nuclear progress.150 Finally, 
material constraints were a critical component to Egypt’s non-proliferation decisions. In 
addition to internal financial struggles, Egypt was deficient in technical capacity. 
According to Solingen, Egypt sought foreign assistance in missile development and nuclear 
infrastructure.151 
It is difficult to find commonalities between Egypt and North Korea. Aside from 
the fact that both countries have ancient histories going back thousands of years, they have 
disparate geographies, politics, and cultures. Perhaps the most significant lesson from an 
Egypt-North Korea comparison is that domestic actors had the most influence on Egypt’s 
decision to join the NPT and to not nuclearize. Even though some advocated for retaining 
a nuclear weapons program, there were enough veto players to favor nuclear restraint.152 
For this to occur in North Korea, domestic veto players would need to rise up, potentially 
from the North Korean elite. Therefore, future U.S. policy should account for and address 
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the potential influence of North Korean elites on the status of North Korean nuclear 
doctrine. 
VIII. Taiwan. There is strong evidence that Taiwan was being driven towards 
nuclear proliferation, but like South Korea, Taiwan demonstrated nuclear restraint and 
abandoned proliferation efforts. Currently, Taiwan does not have an active nuclear 
weapons program. 
This study finds domestic determinants crucially influenced proliferation driving 
decisions. First, domestic political and military leaders were strong advocates for a nuclear 
weapons program. However, domestic determinants were also a significant factor for later 
inhibiting Taiwan’s nuclear weapons program. Solingen claims the restraint Taiwan 
showed in reversing proliferation was partially due to Taiwan’s domestic actors changing 
interests.153 In other words, nuclear weapons no longer supported Taiwan’s interests. The 
Taiwanese regime capitulated to U.S. pressure and abandoned its nuclear program because 
it sought a better chance at “regime survival…economic growth, prosperity, [and] 
stability,” through denuclearization.154 
International factors and material constraints were also influential in proliferation 
decisions. In particular, international factors played both a driving and inhibiting role in 
Taiwan’s proliferation decisions. The perceived security threat from China following the 
1964 nuclear test was a driving catalyst toward nuclear weapons in Taiwan.155 However, 
international pressure by the U.S. on Taiwan in 1976 culminated in a “proliferation 
freeze.”156 Finally, material constraints were a nuclear proliferation driver. Taiwan had the 
necessary material resources for a nuclear weapons program. 
Taiwan makes a good case study because it is an East-Asia country, and is 
partitioned with mainland China, in a similar way that North Korea and South Korea are 
partitioned. Furthermore, Taiwan is a classic security dilemma case between China and the 
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U.S. Under the “One China” policy, the U.S. recognizes the People’s Republic of China as 
the official government, and Taiwan as part of China. The U.S. also “insists on the peaceful 
resolution of cross-Strait differences, opposes unilateral changes to the status quo by either 
side, and encourages both sides to continue their constructive dialogue on the basis of 
dignity and respect.”157 The current political climate is what makes denuclearization in 
Taiwan stick. 
3. Case Study Observations and Findings 
Several observations can be made from the case study data. All eight cases had 
evidence of domestic determinants, but only three have active weapons programs today 
(China, India, and Iran). Additionally, all eight cases had evidence of international factors, 
but again only three have active weapons programs (Libya possibly has driving 
international factors). Lastly, four cases had no inhibiting material constraints and three of 
those cases have no active programs (South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, and China is the 
outlier). 
There are four major findings from this study. First, domestic determinants may 
have the most significant influence on why a country decides to keep an active weapons 
program or not. Proliferation decisions are independently made by each country. The 
decision, however, may come from or be influenced by a variety of domestic actors within 
each country. For example, many of the sampled countries made proliferation decisions 
based on the will of high-level political leaders. Often, political leaders believe nuclear 
weapons serve the political regime’s interests. Although, in some cases, countries with 
enough domestic veto players such as Egypt, are able to change the country’s nuclear 
policy. 
Second, in almost all cases, countries with and without active nuclear weapons 
programs at some point perceived international factors to be a relevant proliferation driver. 
The only country inconclusive in this category is Libya. Otherwise, each of the other 
sampled cases at least initiated a nuclear weapons program; while some barely amounted 
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to anything, others became fully developed with entire arsenals of weapons. Therefore, 
international factors are a critical component in proliferation decisions. It is likely that 
countries who start nuclear weapons programs do so at least partially because they perceive 
an international security threat and nuclear weapons are a viable deterrent. Additionally, 
some countries are perhaps looking to improve their global standings among nuclearized 
countries to be included and relevant in the international community. 
Third, material constraints have a measurable impact among the sampled cases 
regardless of nuclear weapons program status, but are less of a proliferation determinant. 
Material constraints can be a make it or break it component to proliferation. For countries 
who want to develop nuclear weapons programs, material constraints will either support 
that endeavor, or will prove to be a challenge that if not overcome, will likely end the 
country’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, as was the case for Egypt. However, several 
countries who eventually chose non-proliferation were unaffected by negative material 
constraints at the onset of their nuclear weapons programs development and eventually still 
opted for denuclearization. 
Finally, the study identified several paths to undoing nuclear programs with varying 
and, in some instances, debatable success rates. Particular paths are dependent on the 
circumstances surrounding each case as identified in this section. Table 1 in Part B, Section 
1 of this chapter charts just how different North Korea’s circumstances are from the other 
cases in this study. As a result, the factors that led to South Africa, South Korea, Libya, 
Egypt, and Taiwan’s denuclearization are not precisely replicated in the case of North 
Korea. Furthermore, the direct application of any policy on North Korea based on a case 
in this study without revision, may not realize much if it fails to address North Korea’s 
specific proliferation drivers and inhibitors. Even still, there are however, cases from this 
study with nuclear programs (possessing or close to having nuclear weapons) that the U.S. 
and the rest of the non-proliferation regime choose to accept and live with such as China, 
India, and Iran. In the China, India and Iran cases, the U.S. has not adopted and pursued 
purely coercive policy that enforces one goal—denuclearization—rather, the U.S. has 
utilized diplomatic strategies and measures to contain nuclear proliferation. For example, 
China and Iran both signed, and remain in, the NPT and the U.S. reached nuclear deals 
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with both India and Iran. These deals uniquely and distinctly permitted the retention of 
their nuclear programs, but restricted proliferation in exchange for U.S. concessions that 
met their interests. Furthermore, the nuclear deal with India sets precedent for negotiating 
nuclear agreements with non-NPT countries.158 Applying elements of nuclear policy to 
North Korea from these three cases, combined with an acute knowledge of what led the 
other cases to pursue denuclearization, may be the U.S.’s best option for seeing actual 
results. Positive, viable results may be possible as long as the policy goal is focused on 
nuclear proliferation restriction and containment versus complete denuclearization. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Proliferation decisions are complex. Rarely is there a singular driving or inhibiting 
factor. In fact, the same drivers of proliferation are often the same inhibitors of it as well. 
This study offered a macro view of proliferation outcomes across a varied sampling of 
cases from around the world. While the results of the case study are not absolute, it can be 
a useful tool in examining nuclear proliferation in North Korea. More specifically, it can 
help policymakers understand why North Korea decided to pursue nuclear weapons and if 
a foreign policy that demands denuclearization is likely to achieve viable results. 
Chapter II, Section A discussed the perception of threats by North Korea noting 
that North Korea most likely views threats coming from both international and domestic 
sources. North Korea irrefutably has evidence of domestic determinants, international 
factors, and material constraints that have impacted Kim Jung-Un’s, his father’s, and 
grandfather’s proliferation decisions. Like the sample countries in the study, nuclear 
weapons programs are the result of a confluence of drivers, stemming from domestic actors 
faced with international factors. For these countries, nuclear weapons were deemed to be 
suitably aligned to the country’s interests. For those countries who no longer have active 
nuclear weapons programs, something among the driving proliferation factors changed; 
nuclear weapons no longer served the interests of the country in the same way it did before. 
North Korea may be more elusive and more mysterious than the cases studied, but the value 
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North Korea places on its nuclear weapons program is still at its roots driven by domestic 
determinants, international factors, and material constraints. U.S. policy toward North 
Korea must recognize the sources driving proliferation in any policy designed to combat 
it. 
The next chapter examines CVID and assesses its feasibility of achieving viable 
denuclearization results. The chapter presents an analytical discourse on the prospects of 
North Korea denuclearizing. Finally, this chapter will evaluate the future viability of 
continuing with CVID and concludes with recommendations for alternative policies to 
CVID that maintain the U.S.’s security and protect the U.S.’s interests in the South East 
Asia region. 
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IV. NORTH KOREA DENUCLEARIZATION PROSPECTS AND 
ALTERNATIVE POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO CVID 
Kim Jung-Un’s nuclear test in 2016 changed the circumstances of the U.S.-North 
Korea relationship. Chapter II detailed how the U.S. was focused on North Korea’s complete 
denuclearization before it even became capable of producing a weapon and how U.S. policy 
reflected that stance. However, U.S. policy maintains continued emphasis on complete 
denuclearization remaining virtually unchanged and unadjusted to the new circumstances of 
the U.S.-North Korea relationship. Therefore, this thesis advocates that future policy should 
consider the U.S.’s adversary as a de facto nuclear weapons state because that is the current 
reality of the situation.159 The 1994 Agreed Framework, the Six Party Talks, the Leap Day 
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agreement—deals of the past—all focused on the non-proliferation of North Korea through the 
prevention of nuclear weapons attainment. Those days have past, but incongruity with today’s 
policy aims toward North Korea remains.  
The U.S.’s thinking about North Korean relations and resulting actions appear to be 
primarily driven by U.S. national security interests. Those interests include both the “need to 
maintain U.S. strategic presence and influence in the Asia-Pacific region” and homeland 
defense.160 For the U.S., denuclearization is a means to this end. To that point, one scholarly 
report assessed that to the U.S., denuclearization is viewed as the “linchpin” to the “security 
situation on the Peninsula.”161 However, the other side of the argument is that denuclearization 
is in fact a detriment to U.S. security interests.162 Continuation of the complete, verifiable, 
irreversible denuclearization policy towards a de facto nuclear weapons state will do nothing 
but permit more time for North Korea to advance its weapons capabilities. Denuclearization is 
in direct opposition to Kim Jung-Un’s strategic goals. To understand what factors influence a 
state’s nuclear weapons decisions, Chapter III provided an in-depth analysis on the drivers and 
inhibitors of nuclear proliferation. The key findings illustrated that individual country 
proliferation decisions are complex and multicausal, a view commonly shared among nuclear 
proliferation experts. What drives one country to seek nuclear weapons, may not be the same 
drivers for another. Furthermore, they may be the exact reasons why some countries elect to 
denuclearize or display nuclear restraint. Ultimately, both proliferation and non-proliferation 
can be motivated by domestic issues, international issues, or material constraints. The core 
implications of these findings mean that there is more than one pathway to denuclearization as 
demonstrated in the Chapter III case study. Moreover, these non-proliferation paths are 
circumstantial, meaning that unless North Korea shares the same circumstances of another 
country, the policy that worked for one may not make a viable option for North Korea.  
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The ensuing chapter presents the core conclusions of this thesis. It begins by expanding 
on that line of thought that North Korea’s unique circumstances drive its proliferation 
decisions. The first section assesses the prospects for North Korean proliferation and based on 
that assessment, if denuclearization is likely. The next section presents the central conclusion 
of the thesis that CVID is no longer a viable policy option for the U.S. and also provides 
recommendations for alternative policies that may achieve more realistic and attainable results.  
A. PROSPECTS FOR NORTH KOREAN PROLIFERATION 
Knowing the causes and reasons for North Korea’s choice to proliferate nuclear 
weapons and improve weapons capability is a critical element to nuclear policy. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, proliferating states base these decisions on three main factors: domestic 
determinants, international factors, and material constraints. Therefore, to determine why 
North Korea maintains a nuclear weapons program, one must decipher what issues Kim Jung-
Un considers drivers. To this, this thesis advocates that North Korea is driven mostly by 
domestic determinants and international factors. Four main reasons contribute to North 
Korea’s drivers which are regime survival, conflict evasion due to the high costs of war, the 
desire for global recognition and globalization, and the possession of a credible bargaining and 
negotiating chip. 
The great conflict of interest between the U.S. and North Korea, coupled with the 
stagnant coercion strategy to achieve complete denuclearization, has left North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons program largely intact and unchecked. As much as the U.S. wants North Korea to 
completely denuclearize, it is unlikely to happen because it is not in North Korea’s interest to 
do so. For North Korea, a capable nuclear weapons program is a means to achieving a specific 
end—security.  
First, it his highly theorized that North Korea’s perspective is that nuclear weapons 
increase the survivability of the Kim regime. Cha argues, nuclear weapons are used as a shield 
because North Korea “thinks it needs such weapons for its survival.”163 North Korea’s nuclear 
infrastructure is carefully maintained, and the logic is often hidden behind claims of North 
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Korea’s leader’s irrationality. However, many North Korea experts and scholars have a 
different opinion. Lankov claims Kim Jung-Un comes from a family of “ultimate political 
survivors.”164 Moreover, interpreting Kim Jung-Un or the Kim family differently and their 
desire for a capable nuclear weapons program, will result in failed policy by the U.S. He argues, 
“successful policy should be based on understanding the logic of the opposite side, not on 
discarding it as ‘irrational.’ Seeing the Kim family as lunatics with nukes makes them more 
threatening, and raises the risk of war, but it can also promote unrealistic expectations of 
compromise—if only the North comes to its senses [and denuclearizes].”165 For North Korea, 
nuclear weapons are beneficial because they act as a deterrent to potential adversaries, 
therefore, increasing the chances of the Kim regime’s survival. Kim Jung-Un likely “presumes 
that no great power would risk attacking a nuclear state or sticking a hand into its internal 
strife—especially if it has delivery systems and a second-strike capability.”166 
Second, nuclear weapons ensure North Korea’s security by reducing the chances of the 
U.S. initiating conflict due to the high cost of war. U.S. decision-makers consider cost factors 
to war such as casualties, financial costs, domestic political costs, international reputation costs, 
humanitarian and moral costs, escalation risks, and opportunity costs to the U.S. and allies.167 
Lankov argues nuclear weapons keep outside countries from initiating an attack, responding 
to North Korean provocations with a devastating kinetic offensive, and ultimately from 
collapsing the North Korean regime. The deterrence rendered through the threat of North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons, keeps the U.S. and other adversaries from attacking it. Should the 
U.S. attack or respond, the cost of war will potentially outweigh the benefits of war. A 
continuation of a kinetic war on the peninsula could result in a catastrophic number of 
casualties, in the millions, and devastating economic damage for the U.S. and East Asia. 
Additionally, the political costs could be sky-high. If the tolerance and support for an overseas 
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war do not have public support or if war is initiated and the strategic goals are unattained, it 
could cost the U.S. domestic and international political support. Moreover, war with North 
Korea to achieve denuclearization could amount to a nuclear conflict which quickly increases 
the humanitarian/moral risks, as well as escalation risks.  
Third, nuclear weapons work toward North Korea’s global status and recognition in 
order to ensure security. North Korea may be motivated to acquire and maintain a capable 
nuclear weapons program because it seeks international recognition and prestige. Cha argues 
North Korea may view the importance of the nuclear weapons program as a badge.168 Nuclear 
weapons “serve as marks of modernity and power” and include “aspirations to rise in the 
international prestige hierarchy and to be treated as a great or major power.”169 Recognition 
as a de facto nuclear weapons state forces North Korea’s adversaries to do two things. First, to 
consider the possibility North Korea may use nuclear weapons in aggressive scenarios. Second, 
it forces the global community to consider giving North Korea a seat at the international table.  
While security remains the primary end for North Korea, prestige is a secondary goal 
that works to maintain security. Prestige is one of Cirincione’s five drivers of nuclear 
proliferation. “Possession of nuclear weapons, proponents of the prestige model would argue, 
makes states feel more powerful, relevant, and respected.”170 Also, prestige provides Kim 
Jung-Un validation of his regime both domestically and internationally because “nuclear 
weapons and ballistic missiles were symptomatic of a system trying to fulfill its kangsong 
taeguk (strong and prosperous power) vision.”171 Despite the coercive measures consistently 
applied to prevent nuclear proliferation by the U.S. and the international community, North 
Korea has continued to advance its program.172  
Fourth, nuclear weapons ensure North Korea’s security because they can be used as a 
credible bargaining and negotiating chip. As discussed earlier, a weaponized North Korea 
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naturally imposes limits on the U.S. and its allies’ options for dealing with North Korea. The 
U.S. seeks conflict avoidance and chooses coercive strategy options to pressure North Korea 
into denuclearization precisely because the risk of nuclear war is too great. This, in turn, is one 
of the means to maintain the security nuclear weapons provide. Nuclear weapons are as much 
a political tool as they are a tactical tool. Bermudez remarks that “greater instability in the 
[Asia] region” may be on the horizon given the “combination of a growing nuclear weapons 
inventory, a developing ballistic missile force and a nuclear strategy that may be evolving into 
including an option or limited use of these weapons” by North Korea.173 Whether North 
Korea’s nuclear strategy includes the usage of these weapons, their usage in the political arena 
for negotiating and bargaining to their advantage, has been plentiful. 
B. ALTERNATIVES TO CVID  
We must face problems which do not lend themselves to easy or quick or 
permanent solutions. And we must face the fact that the United States is neither 
omnipotent or omniscient—that we are only 6 percent of the world’s 
population—that we cannot impose our will upon the other 94 percent of 
mankind—that we cannot right every wrong or reverse each adversity—and 
that therefore there cannot be an American solution to every world problem.174 
—President John F. Kennedy, 
Address at University of Washington 
 
It is clear that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is driven by domestic 
determinants and international factors. Nuclear weapons serve the Kim regime’s interests and 
is a satisfactory means for achieving the regime’s primary ends—security and survival. The 
U.S. and other countries in the international community have sought to denuclearize North 
Korea through a coercive deterrence strategy despite North Korea’s interests. Over the last four 
U.S. administrations, the U.S. has sought to end North Korea’s nuclear weapons program 
through diplomatic negotiation attempts backed by harsh economic sanctions and the threat of 
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military action in order to pressure North Korea to denuclearize, but to no avail. Knowing 
North Korea’s ultimate goal and the value of nuclear weapons makes it highly unlikely that 
North Korea will ever willingly completely, verifiably, and irreversibly denuclearize. 
The comparative case study conclusion in Chapter IV determined that there are 
multiple pathways to managing nuclear proliferation and even getting to denuclearization. 
Therefore, the U.S. could consider possible alternative policies to CVID that may yield 
different results. This thesis presents three major recommendations for consideration in the 
generation of future U.S.-North Korea policy. First, the United States could adopt a policy that 
accepts North Korea as a de facto nuclear state. This is a controversial proposal. Accepting 
North Korea as an unofficial nuclear weapons state would require a fundamental shift in 
thinking by the U.S., a task that would be difficult to do, but necessary to reduce the nuclear 
threat if North Korea refuses to comply with CVID. Second, the U.S. accepts other countries 
as official and unofficial nuclear weapons states; therefore, this recommendation is for 
policymakers to consider utilizing the non-proliferation lessons learned from other nuclearized 
states. Those lesson are the institution of both nuclear command and control and risk reduction 
measures, the utilization of a multilateral approach to policy, the pursuit of arms control 
initiatives, and the utilization of economic sanctions as collateral leverage. Third, a general 
shift in policy off CVID toward a less coercive approach, adopting a more diplomatic policy 
by balancing out the carrots and sticks approach. This recommendation could yield short-term 
nuclear containment results that could evolve into long-term denuclearization results.  
1. North Korea As a de facto Nuclear Weapons State
Any alternative policy to CVID should be foundationally based in the acceptance that 
North Korea has possession of nuclear weapons. Policy thus far has been for the purposes of 
denying North Korea nuclear weapons and has not accomplished much in the way of 
denuclearization, but perhaps delay the inevitable, which was eventually realized in 2016. 
Since then, Kim Jung-Un has propelled North Korea toward improved nuclear weapons 
capability, the antithesis of the U.S. goal. This recommendation would not be easy for U.S. 
decisionmakers to accept as it is a significant departure from the conventional thinking about 
the direction of North Korea policy and at the surface, seems to run contrary to the U.S.’s 
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beliefs. However, if security is the primary concern for the U.S., then a policy that accepts 
North Korea as a de facto nuclear weapons state versus trying to strip North Korea of its most 
valuable assets and works to contain proliferation would render results more in line with the 
U.S.’s ultimate objective of preserving national security. National security encompasses both 
homeland defense and regional stability in the Southeast Asia. Containment of North Korea’s 
nuclear proliferation would support the U.S.’s national security interests because it provides 
the opportunity for the U.S. and North Korea to develop a rapport based on trust and may 
potentially open a pathway to conflict resolution through diplomacy and negotiation instead of 
coercion and aggression.  
Acceptance of North Korea as a de facto NWS by the U.S. government and the public 
at large may be a difficult undertaking, and that issue should not be taken lightly. There are 
pros and cons to adopting such a fundamental policy shift. The pro-con list for this 
recommendation includes four points for each side of the argument starting with the pros. First, 
Kim Jung-Un may interpret such a policy move as less threatening and coercive to the regime’s 
security. The U.S.-North Korea summits in Singapore and Hanoi were full of all the pageantry 
expected surrounding the leaders of adversarial countries meeting about the topic of North 
Korea denuclearization. However, while it may have been the U.S.’s goal to begin negotiations 
resulting in North Korea denuclearizing, North Korea allegedly had other motives. Jackson’s 
position on the motives of North Korea is that it put on a front during the summit, showing a 
receptivity to denuclearization, but behind the scenes was looking at the summit as an 
opportunity to “consolidat [e] North Korea’s status as a ‘global nuclear strategic state,’” a goal 
that is quite “the opposite of denuclearization.”175 This concealed motive illustrates Kim Jung-
Un’s utter desire to retain North Korea’s nuclear weapons and also eludes to a secondary 
motive of global recognition as a nuclear weapons capable state. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that the Hanoi summit did not produce the progress toward denuclearization that the U.S. 
wanted because denuclearization is incompatible with Kim Jung-Un’s interests. One can 
reasonably conclude that Kim Jung-Un will not voluntarily negotiate to comply with CVID in 
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any future diplomatic meetings because ridding North Korea of nuclear weapons makes the 
Kim regime vulnerable. 
Second, showing an acceptance of North Korea as a de facto NWS in U.S. policy may 
reduce provocations and subsequently also reduce the homeland security threat. In 2011, five 
years before North Korea’s first nuclear weapons test, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 
identified North Korea as an emerging nuclear threat, remarking that it was a “direct threat to 
the United States” due to North Korea’s relentless pursuit of improved nuclear weapons 
capabilities and delivery systems. Nearly ten years after Secretary Gates made his assessment, 
North Korea has achieved this challenging milestone and the U.S. has been able to affect very 
little change to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program through its policy. Additionally, after 
a two-year détente period surrounding the U.S.-North Korea summits, North Korea reengaged 
in provocative by launching a series of rocket and short-range ballistic missile tests in May 
2019, signaling an end of any sort of nuclear moratorium.176 North Korea also reached a point 
in its program’s delivery systems technology where it is feasible for a North Korean ICBM to 
reach the U.S.177  
Provocations are a key tool in Pyongyang’s strategy of brinksmanship—the practice of 
one state to forcibly push a political position or objective on another state through 
confrontation, often achieved through acts of aggression. Like his father and grandfather before 
him, Kim Jung-Un has continued a provocation campaign against the U.S. However, under his 
reign, these provocations are different, and demonstrate a link to nuclear proliferation. Analysts 
have studied the relationship between provocations and possible “triggering” events. Foreign 
Affairs Officer Ashley A.C. Hess, PhD from the Bureau of International Security and 
Nonproliferation conducted a study of North Korean provocations and perceived trigger 
events. The study concluded that there was not a significant correlation between provocations 
and trigger events, but there did appear to be a cyclic trend to provocations. In other words, a 
pattern emerged depicting that after an initial provocation, it was common for North Korea to 
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make another one or more shortly thereafter of lesser intensity.178 Similarly, Lisa Collin’s 
study at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, specifically analyzed the relationship 
between U.S.-North Korea negotiations and North Korea provocations from 1990–2017. She 
concluded that there is a correlation between negotiations and provocations; specifically, when 
negotiations occurred, provocations decreased.179 Based on the findings of both studies, it is 
possible to conclude the détente period surrounding the two summits was a result of the normal 
cyclic pattern of provocations, but Collins’ argues it is more likely that this was the result of 
the correlation identified between negotiations and provocations. Knowing that there is a 
glimmer of consistency in the timing of provocations leads to uncovering what North Korea 
really wants to achieve with provocations. The most probable of answers is, North Korea wants 
to build a capable nuclear weapons program; the provocations are a pathway to continue 
nuclear research and development in order to protect the Kim regime.180 
To the naked eye, accepting North Korea as a de facto NWS appears to indicate an 
expectation of increased provocations and homeland security threat, but that is a matter of 
perspective. If U.S. policy approaches North Korea diplomatically, through continued talks 
and negotiations in recognition of its nuclear status, North Korea will potentially be less 
threatened by the U.S. and weary of potential U.S. actions to denuclearize North Korea by 
force. Therefore, becoming more amenable to negotiating realistic nuclear weapons 
containment measures with the potential to lead to denuclearization one day.  
Third, de facto NWS status may actually lower proliferation as opposed to CVID which 
has not curtailed North Korea’s proliferation. North Korea’s proliferation drivers are 
predominantly due to domestic determinants and international factors. Section A outlined the 
reasons behind these proliferation drivers as concern over regime security and survival, 
decreasing the chances of the U.S. instigating war against North Korea, improving global 
recognition status and globalization of North Korea, and using nuclear weapons as a credible 
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bargaining and negotiating chip. Similarly, Cirincione’s theory argues that the reasons states 
are driven to proliferate, are the same reasons states restrain against proliferation. CVID does 
not address North Korea’s specific proliferating drivers, in fact, it appears to ignore North 
Korea’s proliferation drivers completely by taking away the very thing North Korea sees as its 
best way to maintain its interests. Whereas the acceptance of North Korea as a de facto NWS 
will recognize North Korea’s drivers, while not necessarily condoning or advocating for its 
nuclear weapons program. Policy toward North Korea would diplomatically say that the U.S. 
recognized North Korea has a nuclear weapons program and that instead of only negotiating 
for denuclearization, the U.S. wants to take steps that will contain North Korea’s nuclear 
program and reduce the threat it causes to the U.S. and its regional allies. This is a subtle 
change, but one that does two things to reduce North Korea proliferation. First, it actually 
recognizes North Korea as an NWS, rather than treating North Korea as though it does not 
have a capable nuclear weapons program or undermine the value North Korea sees in its 
nuclear weapons program. Second, while it addresses North Korea as a de facto nuclear 
weapons state, the policy should not and does not automatically mean the U.S. is a champion 
of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. This change is a step toward bridging the gap in 
trust between the U.S. and North Korea and through a reenforced relationship, can take steps 
that will, at a minimum, contain North Korea’s proliferation, to lay the necessary pathway to 
ultimately eliminate it. 
Fourth, U.S.-North Korea diplomatic relations may be improved. The CVID approach 
has never been fully realized and, at best, it has resulted in intermittent diplomacy between the 
two countries. Over time, North Korea has made vague and often superficial statements about 
denuclearizing and the actions it will take towards that end. However, under this policy 
objective, the U.S. would be negotiating from a position of de facto NWS recognition that can 
be viewed as a relatively easy concession which, as discussed earlier, does not outright condone 
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. This policy change could lead to “a more 
constructive, long-term US-[North Korea] DPRK relationship,” that “should no longer be a 
reward for the North’s complete nuclear dismantlement but would be treated as an explicit U.S. 
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security objective in its own right.”181 In sum, North Korea would no longer be relegated to 
entering diplomatic meetings with the sole objective of preserving its nuclear weapons; 
therefore, North Korea may be more inclined to negotiate toward containment and, ultimately, 
threat reduction. 
There is no action that can be taken with regard to North Korean nuclear weapons, 
diplomatic or otherwise, that is perfect in all aspects. With that in mind, accepting North Korea 
as a de facto nuclear weapons state in the United States’ foreign policy does have four 
drawbacks. First, and perhaps the most obvious, is North Korea will still retain nuclear 
weapons. This is a negative aspect that has to be well understood and accepted by policymakers 
and is a departure from prior beliefs that negotiating anything but denuclearization is a failure 
leading to a less secure homeland and less stable region.182 Denuclearizing North Korea is a 
long-term objective, not a short-term one. Therefore, policy must work within those objectives 
and towards ridding North Korea of nuclear weapons, eventually, not demanding it upfront.  
Second, it is possible that Kim Jung-Un and the world may interpret this as a weak 
foreign policy move. North Korea may view this as a signal of victory in the achievement of 
its ultimate goal. Whether this creates a less secure situation for the United States or develops 
into jarring regional instability is a bit of a risk. However, the likelihood Kim Jung-Un will 
react negatively seems to be low according to some North Korea experts. Van Jackson’s 
perspective supports a change from CVID policy and believes Kim Jung-Un will be more 
receptive to a different strategy. He argues “as long as disarmament of North Korea remains 
America’s professed goal, Kim Jong Un has every incentive either to avoid the negotiating 
process or favorably manipulate it at America’s expense.”183 Furthermore, the lack of success 
with CVID has been attributed to a deficient understanding of Kim Jung-Un and his true 
intentions, and the value he places on the continuation of his nuclear weapons program.184 The 
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question of whether the world will see the U.S. as weak seems to be relatively moot because 
this policy direction keeps the door open for diplomacy with not just the U.S. but other 
countries with invested interest in seeing the North Korea threat reduced. Furthermore, this 
type of ongoing cooperation with North Korea could spark cooperation with China on the 
North Korea nuclear issue. Through approaching diplomacy from a position of acceptance of 
the fact that North Korea is a de facto NWS, North Korea is more likely to continue 
negotiations and this new approach may also entice China to uphold its end of the deal and 
stop swaying back and forth on the issue.185 
Third, de facto NWS based policy may weaken the nonproliferation regime and the 
NPT. This is certainly possible, but policymakers must evaluate the cost-benefits of a reduced 
North Korea threat versus the potential weakening of the NPT. Consider Iran as an example of 
U.S. policy that recognizes the foreign state as a de facto NWS. In this example, some critics 
of the JCPOA with Iran claim the deal—a multilateral deal which restricts Iran’s acquisition 
of nuclear weapons by limiting Iran’s ability to develop its nuclear program—undermines 
nonproliferation and does not reenforce the goal of “nonproliferation and strengthening of the 
NPT.”186 However, others conclude overall, and prior to the U.S. withdrawal from it, the deal 
was proving quite successful and was on the road to accomplishing its goals of restricting Iran 
from becoming a nuclear weapons state for a decade and beyond.187 According to Siegfried 
Hecker, when it comes to North Korea the U.S. should pursue “freezing the sophistication” of 
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, concluding that it “is a necessary precursor to rolling 
it back in a step-by-step process.”188 This proposed alternative policy would be based on the 
fact that North Korea has nuclear weapons and would no longer demand denuclearization up 
front. It does not mean that the U.S.’s ultimate goal is not the elimination of North Korea’s 
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nuclear weapons, but instead approaches denuclearization through a proliferation containment 
policy objective in accordance with the aims of the NPT.  
Fourth, this alternative policy may have the opposite effect and heighten nuclear 
tensions. Allowing North Korea to keep its nuclear weapons program, at least initially, may be 
interpreted as a green light to Kim Jung-Un to raise nuclear tensions. This possible drawback 
though seems unlikely when one considers again that the suspected primary role that nuclear 
weapons play in North Korea is for security assurances. Cha further emphasizes a few 
objectives North Korea may also want such as getting a peace agreement with the U.S., 
international community recognition and inclusion, sovereign statehood status, and a political 
relationship with the U.S.189 On the status of its nuclear weapons, Cha asserts that at best North 
Korea “may part with some, not all of their weapons capacity” and he suspects North Korea 
may actually be interested “in arms control negotiations with the United States to reduce 
mutual threat, but it will not give up all of its weapons.”190 
There are considerable potential advantages and drawbacks to infusing U.S.-North 
Korea policy with a foundation that recognizes North Korea as a de facto nuclear weapons 
state. Of the cons, the most significant ones that will have to be dealt with is the foremost fact 
that North Korea will still have nuclear weapons and also the perspective that this weakens the 
non-proliferation regime and the NPT. Arguments can be made for and against leaving North 
Korea with nuclear weapons, but considering the current situation, how is it any different? The 
NPT will continue to exist, and the non-proliferation regime has adopted policies and strategies 
with other non-NPT NWS’s that are less coercive and hardline than CVID in efforts to contain 
and reduce nuclear proliferation. Continuation of the same CVID policy with no results, or 
worse, counter results, indicated that policymakers are in the trap Victor Cha warns about 
happening when “policymakers…adhering to familiar policy templates and then, rather than 
reassessing the nature of the North Korean threat, they simply assume that the threat continues 
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to fit with these templates.”191 This repetitive attempt to enforce CVID could become even 
more counterproductive in the end. “Fitting threats to policies rather than policies to threats in 
this manner is dangerous because the successful strategy that brought peace in one era could 
bring the opposite result in another.”192 Adjusting the policy mindset to deal with North Korea 
not as a perspective nuclear state but as a nuclear state is step one to achieving a viable policy 
that results in genuine movement toward denuclearization. The next step is selecting a policy 
strategy that moves away from CVID and looks to engage with North Korea incrementally to 
effect change. The next section takes an in depth look at this challenge and recommends five 
policy strategies or a combination thereof to reduce the proliferation threat. To begin, the U.S. 
could apply lessons learned from other nuclear powers. Some possible options include 
command and control organization and methods of risk reduction, adopting a multilateral 
approach to policy, engaging in arms control initiatives, continuing with a sanctions strategy 
to tighten the grip on North Korea’s material constraints, and embracing a more diplomatic 
approach to policy to balance out the carrots and sticks approach. 
2. Lessons Learned from Other Nuclear Powers 
This thesis’s case study in Chapter III included a few nuclear weapons states. The U.S. 
is able to live with and accept that some countries are indeed nuclear powers or are ambitiously 
working toward that goal. China has a nuclear weapons program and the U.S. accepts it. India 
has one and the U.S. has learned to live with it as well. Perhaps the U.S.-Russia dyad is the 
most storied of the nuclear relationships. Even after the Cold War, the U.S. still accepts a 
certain level of risk living with a nuclear armed Russia. The U.S. manages to accept the nuclear 
weapons programs from all of these examples, like it or not, and this thesis identifies five 
lessons learned from the U.S.’s interaction with other NWSs. A key element to that acceptance 
is nuclear security. There are two possible lessons learned in nuclear security from these 
nuclear weapons states that can be applied to the U.S.-North Korea nuclear dyad: the 
importance of ensuring positive command and control and active engagement in risk reduction. 
Furthermore, some of the most successful nuclear negotiations have been multilateral over 
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bilateral approaches to policy. In particular, the Agreed Framework and the JCPOA both 
achieved many of its objectives and therefore are good examples to model future policy from. 
Arms control initiatives have achieved similar successes in reducing the nuclear threat and 
containing proliferation as exemplified with Russia. Moreover, the U.S. and the non-
proliferation regime have a long history of imposing a variety of sanction to minimize nuclear 
proliferation threats. Sanctions as a tool to enforce policy have worked in the past and should 
continue to be utilized as necessary.  
a. Nuclear Command and Control 
Nuclear command and control (NC2) is a key feature in nuclear security. Knowing and 
declaring within the organization and in policy who the key players are in the nuclear weapons 
program is crucial and is defined by the U.S. as  
the exercise of authority and direction by the President, as Commander in 
Chief, through established command lines, over nuclear weapon operations of 
military forces; as Chief Executive over all Government activities that support 
those operations; and, as Head of State over required multinational actions that 
support those operations.193 
NC2 is important because it is a mechanism that ensures there is both positive and 
negative control over the nuclear weapons. Positive control meaning, when command 
authorities want to use nuclear weapons, they are available, and negative control meaning, 
nuclear weapons will not be used until the command authority directs it.194 There are two 
primary aspects to NC2, the human and technical components.195 Human components include 
the command authority for the use of nuclear weapons and it looks different for different 
countries. In the U.S. the command authority is the President, in China it is believed to be with 
the Chairman of the Central Military Commission,196 in India command authority consists of 
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“two elements, the ‘political council headed by the prime minister and an executive council 
presided over by the national security advisor,’”197and in Iran, the human component of NC2 
is slightly more complicated. It is believed the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran operates 
the nuclear program, but “acts upon decisions made by the country’s Supreme National 
Security Council.”198 This indicates that the executive command decisions are made at least 
at the National Security Council level. 
The other side of NC2 is the technical component. As with the human side, this part 
appears differently for different countries. Examples of technical NC2 are “command posts, 
communication networks, early warning systems, attack assessment means, surveillance 
systems, and safety mechanisms such as permissive action links.”199 In a discussion about 
nuclear stability, specifically in South Asia, Ian Hall stresses the importance of technical NC2 
components and observes that overall, it is an area that needs improvement, claiming a 
fundamental requirement for nuclear stability is the “general confidence that the weapons and 
the command-and-control systems that are declared to work actually do work.”200 
Therefore, this thesis recommends the U.S. consider the NC2 lessons of other nuclear 
capable countries and ensure future policy based on acceptance of North Korea as a de facto 
NWS include measures for positive NC2. As Hall suggests, the existing NC2 in the region may 
need improvement, but the key observation is that there is precedent for it in the region. The 
U.S. could lean on that as a way to entice North Korea into accepting this condition.  
b. Risk Reduction 
The other lesson learned from nuclear powers that contributes to nuclear security is 
risk reduction efforts. In this area, China is a good example. China reduces nuclear security 
risk through multiple methods. The first method is nuclear weapons program transparency. 
China does not publicly release all information of its nuclear arsenal and capabilities, but it 
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does release some.201 For example, SIPRI reports “China now publicly displays its nuclear 
forces more frequently than in the past but releases little information about force numbers or 
future development plans.”202 Some academics give China slightly more credit regarding 
transparency crediting China with an unusually high amount of transparency for a country 
whose “nuclear weapons program developed in a closed political environment.”203 The fact 
that China’s program originated and is contained within China’s authoritarian government 
makes it a good comparative example with North Korea’s authoritarian government and also 
shows, that it can be done. Moreover, China has also engaged in risk reduction through the 
participation in international nuclear security summits, the development of nuclear security 
policies, the development of a nuclear security legislation and regulations, and through the 
creation of a system of nuclear security management, monitoring, and emergency response.204 
Lastly, Kutchesfahani claims China’s own self-image plays a significant role in China’s steps 
toward nuclear security risk reduction. This is demonstrated in China’s progressive 
improvement in the rankings on the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s Nuclear Security Index.205 She 
claims the improvements are related to how China views itself as a nuclear power and wants 
the rest of the world to view China, concluding that China’s position on “nuclear risk reduction 
are likely motivated by two factors: First, its long-standing nuclear weapons history. And 
second, its self-image as the most responsible of the nuclear powers, as opposed to one that is 
dangerous and expansionist.”206  
China and North Korea are not mirror images of each other, but they do have some 
similarities besides variations of authoritarianism. One similarity may be how North Korea 
wants to be perceived by the rest of the world: as a modern nuclear power. Playing into North 
Korea’s self-image and desire for the spotlight in the international community as a legitimate 
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nuclear power may be a useful tactic for the U.S. in an alternative policy for North Korea. By 
giving this aspect of North Korea’s interests attention within U.S. policy, it may create more 
opportunity to then negotiate nuclear constraint measures that reduces risk to U.S. national 
security. As China exemplifies through its risk reduction actions, it is possible to safely and 
securely maintain nuclear weapons and be a legitimate nuclear power. 
c. Multilateral Approach to Policy 
Another recommended alternative to CVID is utilizing a multilateral approach to 
policy. International and multilateral diplomacy can be effective non-proliferation tools. The 
goal of this approach is two-fold. First, as the name implies, this would be an effort with 
multiple parties involved. Second, this approach looks to immediately slow down North 
Korea’s nuclear proliferation efforts and make denuclearization an ultimate goal versus and 
immediate and solitary goal.  
Past multilateral efforts such as the Agreed Framework and Six Party Talks (see 
Chapter II) had some better results than the U.S.’s bilateral efforts of 2018–2019. However, 
there were gaps with those strategies as well. Yet there are elements to these examples that 
make them good models for a new multilateral approach to policy. Consider the Agreed 
Framework with North Korea and the JCPOA with Iran. The Agreed Framework was a 
multilateral agreement and although it broke down, it did last for nearly a decade and had long 
periods of compliance. Additionally, the international, multilateral JCPOA between the 
remaining P5+1 and Iran has remained intact, although on shaky ground, for two years 
following the U.S.’s withdrawal. In the meantime, the other United Nations Security Council 
members have applied pressure to keep Iran in the agreement. Einhorn gives international and 
multilateral diplomacy a great deal of credit for progress in non-proliferation. He advocates for 
the application of this diplomacy in future nuclear agreements with North Korea. Einhorn still 
finds room from bilateral negotiations within the context of multilateral negotiations, citing 
that “embedding bilateral talks in a multilateral framework, such as the previous Six Party 
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Talks, could give any outcome greater international standing and facilitate implementation and 
enforcement.”207  
d. Arms Control Initiatives 
A policy that pursues an arms control objective over CVID is an alternative that may 
do a great deal to minimize the nuclear security risk and make progress toward eventual 
denuclearization. An arms control focus would not rid Kim Jung-Un of his highly valuable 
nuclear weapons, but would “cap North Korea’s arsenal of nuclear and long-range missiles and 
prevent their export.” 
Such a policy has been a successful strategy in the post-Cold War environment with 
Russia and may be applicable and gain positive traction with North Korea as well. Arms control 
measures are not always successful, and some research has shown that democratic 
governments are more likely to abide by arms control agreements, however, that is a tendency 
and not a political science truth.208 Arms control agreements are more likely to be successful 
if certain prerequisites are met. The U.S. should pursue arms control if: the outcomes are in the 
interest of national security,209 it includes a built-in expectation of and plan for when North 
Korea cheats on the agreement,210 and it incentivizes arms control cooperation and verification 
with something that will motivate North Korea.211 
The first step in arms control is looking for consensus among U.S. decision-makers. 
Gottemoeller argues for “treaty-based arms control.”212 Treaty-based arms control should be 
pursued because they are “among the most authoritative documents in the land.”213 The 
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ratification process “requires both executive and legislative branches” which means 
proponents of arms control must make a clear bipartisan argument for how these arms control 
measures are in the interest of national security.214 Nuclear arms control advocates must base 
this recommendation on an outcome that protects the U.S.’s national security interests to induce 
support across party-lines. 
Any nuclear arms control policies should contain an expectation that at some point, 
North Korea will cheat on the policy terms and how the U.S. will handle such a situation. 
Mistrust and competing priorities of the authoritarian government may propel Kim Jung-Un to 
become delinquent on the agreement as Russia has done several times in the past.215 Knowing 
that this scenario is likely, the U.S. can include a plan for dealing with such infractions. In this 
area, U.S.-Russia arms control history provides as a worthy illustration. “For example, the 
United States stood by the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 1985 when the administration 
of then U.S. President Ronald Reagan learnt that the Soviet Union had built prohibited radars. 
Instead of tearing up the treaty, Reagan used the evidence to pressure the Soviets into accepting 
a subsequent agreement that placed more restrictions on their arsenal.”216 
Lastly, it is unrealistic to expect any country to completely cooperate with nuclear arms 
control terms and submit to verification of compliance without there being a strong perception 
of adequate incentive. This thesis has established that Kim Jung-Un places such a high value 
on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, it is impractical to anticipate that he will negotiate 
with them unless he sees value in doing so. Because Kim Jung-Un prioritizes the security of 
the regime at the top, the U.S. must assume that he will protect that at all costs and must find 
another area that both sides are willing to deal in. For example, the U.S. may be able to motivate 
North Korea to not only cooperate but permit verification of adherence to the policy through 
the following measures. The U.S. could offer a “peace regime process, phased troop reduction 
in South Korea, cooperative threat reduction funds, snapback sanctions relief, and a sanctions 
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removal working group.”217 There is precedent for doing something similar to this and it may 
have been marginally responsible for the peaceful period in 2019 when President Trump 
agreed to stop combined U.S.-South Korea military exercises on the peninsula.218 The next 
alternative further analyzes sanctions relief as a driving motivation for North Korea to comply 
with arms control initiatives.  
e. Sanctions as Leverage 
Sanctions are an economic tool at the disposal of states and institutions to affect the 
will and actions of another state. Most experts believe that sanctions are a limited resource that 
should be carefully and strategically applied for a specific period of time. Sanctions that are 
too light or too severe could have unintended consequences and not achieve the desired effect 
as countries under sanctions look for workarounds and ways out from underneath them. 
Additionally, sanctions are subject to time: Some experts argue that sanctions take years to 
render their full effect, and it is common for the end goal to never be achieved because the 
enforcing entity(s) becomes impatient and therefore, weakens or rescinds the sanctions before 
any significant impacts have taken their toll.219 Sanctions are not new to North Korea. Both 
unilateral and bilateral sanction have been applied to North Korea for several years particularly 
due to North Korea’s “activities related to weapons proliferation.”220 The U.S. specifically has 
the following economic sanctions on North Korea still in place: limits and prohibitions on 
trade, arms sales and transfers, financial transactions and banking restrictions, U.S. new 
investment, U.S. foreign aid, blockage of U.S.-based assets, dealings with the Kim Jung-Un 
regime, and U.S. travel to or through North Korea.221 Clearly these sanctions have not been 
able to prevent nuclearization, but they have been observed to have “exacted a heavy toll on 
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the economy.”222 In fact, the second U.S.-North Korea summit in Vietnam unexpectedly 
concluded early, without an agreement due to disagreement over sanctions relief. President 
Trump commented on the summit, saying, “they wanted the sanctions lifted in their entirety, 
and we couldn’t do that. They were willing to denuke a large portion of the areas that we 
wanted, but we couldn’t give up all the sanctions for that.”223 This indicates that North Korea 
does feel the effects of heavy economic sanctions. Therefore, economic sanctions, applied 
properly and consistently can become a useful leveraging tool in U.S. foreign policy with North 
Korea. 
North Korea’s current economic state appears to be in a weakened status and may be 
an opportunity for the U.S. to take advantage of a perceived vulnerability to pursue 
denuclearization by using sanctions as leverage. During a speech delivered on October 10, 
2020 at the 75th Anniversary of the Korean Workers’ Party celebration, Kim Jung-Un 
expressed “feel [ing] sorry for his people for not delivering, not catering for their economic 
needs.”224 As was witnessed in the Hanoi Summit, Kim Jung-Un is emphasizing a desire to 
bolster North Korea’s economy, but “sanctions are still influencing economic woes in North 
Korea.”225 There is an opening here with North Korea’s economic status, to look for a trade 
between North Korea’s steps toward denuclearization and the U.S. offering up more sanctions 
relief than it has in recent years. The U.S. could develop a “compensation package” which 
consists of multiple items to include relief from “certain sanctions.”226 Furthermore, any offer 
of sanctions relief becomes void should North Korea not comply with the terms.227 In sum, 
sanctions relief alone is unlikely to convince Kim Jung-Un to denuclearize and, realistically, 
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nothing on its own likely will. But if Kim Jung-Un is making an improved economy a priority, 
then a promise of sanctions relief in exchange for incremental steps toward denuclearization 
may be an alternative strategy to nuclear policy that the U.S. can capitalize on and will yield 
viable and tangible results. 
3. Diplomatic Policy Approach Over Coercive Policy Approach 
Finally, this recommended alternative pathway to denuclearization advocates for the 
U.S. to pursue a policy approach that is more focused on diplomacy than coercion. To 
accomplish this, policy would be based on a blend of carrot and stick strategies, carrots being 
promises made in the event of positive behavior and sticks being threats made in the event of 
negative behavior. The 2017–2019 Maximum Pressure Campaign was a strategy used to 
impose CVID and a significant portion of Maximum Pressure relied on coercive strategies. It 
“included strong UN and U.S. sanctions on key North Korean entities and certain Chinese 
banks and facilitators...aggressive measures against the North’s global illicit activities, an 
international diplomatic effort, and increased emphasis on the military deterrence capabilities 
of the ROK-U.S. alliance.”228 In this recommendation, instead of backing CVID through 
coercion which seeks to attain behavior modification of the adversary through threats of 
violence; this strategy would seek to entice behavior modification through the inclusion of 
more diplomatic gestures.  
The blended carrot and stick approach will likely appeal more to North Korea if it 
considers North Korea’s intent and interests. Additionally, with this new approach, the U.S. 
should seek to improve the durability of North Korea’s agreements by making equally 
significant concessions to North Korea and following through with them. Lastly, any strategy 
will find success difficult if the U.S. does not approach the strategy with its allies, specifically 
South Korea, in mind. For a new strategy to make any progress, the U.S. must remain engaged 
and supportive of the U.S.-South Korea Alliance. 
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In short, the U.S. can still pursue denuclearization but may see more success with a 
different strategy that blends some current strategy aspects and the recommended ones that 
have been discussed in this section of the thesis. For example, utilizing areas such as sanctions 
and military deterrence (sticks) with some more diplomatic gestures (carrots) such as arms 
control agreements, sanctions relief, and multilateral negotiations to elicit North Korean 
cooperation. 
C. CONCLUSION 
This thesis asked if continuing to pursue a policy with North Korea which demanded 
CVID—complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization—is the best policy to achieve 
viable results. The research determined that there are alternatives to CVID that would yield 
more concrete results in the future. Curbing nuclear proliferation in North Korea will take more 
than what has been done thus far. It is well understood that North Korea’s track record for 
nuclear agreement compliance is bad and it rarely fully complies with the terms of the 
agreements. It is difficult to ascertain with complete certainty what North Korea’s true motives 
and intentions are due to its reclusive characteristics, but it is widely accepted that Kim Jung-
Un places extreme value in the benefits of a nuclear weapons program for a variety of probable 
reasons that this thesis explored. This thesis finds that policy that supports the goal of 
containing and reducing North Korean nuclear proliferation, instead of only eliminating it, is 
likely to be more successful. The recommendations for alternative policy in this thesis are not 
all inclusive, but it is a new direction to explore for building diplomatic relations and repour 
that will mitigate and reduce the immediate North Korea nuclear threat, maintain U.S. security, 
national interests and stability in the region, and be a pathway toward denuclearization in time.  
This thesis further recommends that future policy—whatever it may be—consider 
doing the following: 
• Reconsider North Korea’s threat perception and what its interests in nuclear 
weapons are. 
• Develop policy grounded in the acceptance of North Korea as a defacto 
nuclear weapons state and consider the factors that drove North Korea and 
other states to nuclearize and similarly, to abort nuclearization. 
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• Develop policy that considers Kim Jung-Un as a rational actor who will be 
extremely unlikely to roll back his nuclear weapons program for what may be 
considered an uneven trade and of much lesser value than the nuclear 
weapons program. 
• View denuclearization as a long-term goal and take policy action that 
addresses near-term goals that are less than full denuclearization. 
Moreover, this thesis recognizes that the best option for U.S. national security is the 
complete dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. However, through the 
research, especially through the comparative case study, it also recognizes that the pathways 
to denuclearization are unique to the circumstances of the country involved. Therefore, it is in 
the interests of the U.S., the non-proliferation regime, and the international community to work 
together to resolve the unique nuclear proliferation threat posed by North Korea. Cooperation 
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